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Abstract 
We relate derivatives usage to the level of corporate governance/monitoring mechanisms, managerial 
incentives and investment decisions of UK firms. We find evidence to suggest that the monitoring environment, 
e.g., board size, influences the use of both currency and interest rate derivatives usage. Managerial 
compensation also influences derivatives usage. Investment decisions are affected by the governance and 
managerial compensation of firms, which in turn impact on derivatives usage. We find a strong tendency for 
UK firms to reduce derivatives usage in situations where derivatives usage should be increased. There is 
limited evidence that firms use hedging substitutes to avoid monitoring from external capital markets.  
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1. Introduction 
The corporate governance (CG) arrangements of firms and their level of executive remuneration are important 
areas of public interest and academic research.1 Firm performance has been attributed to the strength of their 
CG and monitoring arrangements as well as the degree of alignment between managerial and shareholder 
interests (Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005).2 Theoretical work relates investment decisions to 
executive remuneration (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1984), such that, depending on the types of 
managerial incentives, managers can maximise their personal wealth at the expense of shareholders. The more 
convex the pay structure of managers, the less incentive managers have to manage risk (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Thus, both the extent of monitoring mechanisms and the types of managerial incentives can cause managers 
to take on more risk when they stand to benefit more than shareholders from investment decisions. Tufano 
(1996), for example, reports that managers holding stock options, manage a smaller proportion of the firm’s 
risk, whereas those holding common stocks manage more risk. In situations of manager-shareholder conflicts, 
investment distortions occur, such that managers reject positive net present value (NPV) projects 
(underinvestment distortion) and undertake value destroying investment projects (overinvestment distortion). 
Risk management theories provide a role for the use of derivatives to manage managerial incentives and to 
reduce investment distortion and agency costs (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot et al., 1993; Tufano, 1998). The 
UK Financial Reporting Council (2014) indicates that the board of directors is ultimately responsible for risk 
management and internal control.3 However, the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms within firms may 
reflect the desire of internal directors to limit the moderating effects of monitoring mechanisms in order to 
enhance managerial wealth.4 In this case, the use of derivatives will depend on the strength of the monitoring 
mechanisms in place as well as the desire of managers to gain an advantage from investment decisions. 
Investment distortion costs can also occur if firms use hedging substitutes rather than financial derivatives to 
manage their risk (see Tufano, 1998). 
This paper, therefore, examines the linkages between derivatives usage and monitoring mechanisms and how 
they relate to managerial incentives and investment decisions. We use a sample of UK listed non-financial 
firms for this purpose. If firms with higher monitoring mechanisms and managerial incentives also make 
greater use of derivatives, this finding would be consistent with the view that firms establish monitoring 
mechanisms to protect the interests of both managers and shareholders. A negative relation is indicative of risk 
                                                          
1 The voluntary code of conduct on CG and executive remuneration for UK listed firms are contained in a series of reports for 
practitioners (The Cadbury Report, 1992; The Hampel Report, 1998; The Walker Review, 2009; The UK Financial Reporting Council, 
2010). Regulatory changes have been especially pronounced for US firms in the form of legally enforceable rules of the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Act 2010. 
2 Hereafter, we use the expressions of CG and monitoring mechanisms interchangeably. 
3 The UK code of conduct requires that directors of listed firms comply or explain their approach to monitoring risk (Cadbury Report, 
1992). The UK Financial Reporting Council (2014, p. 3) gives the board of directors “ultimate responsibility for risk management and 
internal control, including for the determination of the nature and extent of the principal risks it is willing to take to achieve its strategic 
objectives and for ensuring that an appropriate culture has been embedded throughout the organization”. 
4 The UK government has made several attempts to provide a legislative framework to ensure that shareholders control and vote on the 
level of directors’ remuneration. These attempts have failed to varying degrees (Available at: https://goo.gl/cM8abQ).  
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taking to benefit managers more than shareholders. Also, if inside dominated boards make greater use of 
derivatives, this would suggest that derivatives are used to enhance both shareholder and managerial interests. 
Depending on the circumstances that firms are facing, the extent of monitoring may be influenced by regulatory 
changes that require greater oversight by both external and internal directors.5 We focus on situations where 
firms use either currency or interest rate (IR) derivatives in the presence of investment decisions. Our approach 
is in line with agency costs, where investment decisions are not always aligned with shareholders’ interest 
(Tufano, 1998). 
The use of derivatives therefore provides a useful setting to carry out our tests, since firms use currency and 
IR derivatives for different reasons.6 Specifically, currency derivatives are used to manage the exposure of 
foreign cash flows, whereas IR derivatives are used to manage exposure to IR changes and increase leverage 
(El-Masry, 2006; Bodnar et al., 2013). Since the UK bankruptcy codes favour creditors more than shareholders 
(Franks et al., 1996), UK firms might have more concerns over expected liquidity and financial distress costs, 
compared to the effects of currency fluctuations on foreign cash flows. Of course, some firms use both currency 
and IR derivatives and we deal with this aspect separately. Whether firms use currency or IR derivatives 
depends on their circumstances. Currency derivatives users are more likely to be global firms. IR derivatives 
users are likely to be more national in their orientation although IR derivatives can also be used to manage the 
risk associated with foreign debts. The use of IR derivatives is an important element of capital structure 
decisions (Borokhovich et al., 2004; Visvanathan, 1998), with IR derivatives being used to support credit rating 
upgrades (Simkins and Rogers, 2006).  
Our paper focuses on four main issues: (i) the extent to which monitoring mechanisms relate separately to 
currency and IR derivatives usage; (ii) the relation between managerial incentives/compensation and 
derivatives usage; (iii) the link between derivatives usage and investment distortion costs; and (iv) the relation 
between the use of hedging substitutes and derivatives usage. In the latter case, firms may use hedging 
substitutes rather than derivatives to avoid external monitoring by external markets. An important setting for 
these issues is with respect to investment distortion costs. Tufano (1998) shows that firms can implement risk 
management programmes to manage internal cash surpluses and shortages and, in turn, reduce investment 
distortion costs.  
To undertake our study, we analyse separate sub-samples of currency and IR derivatives users and contrast 
their attributes with those of non-users. This approach allows us to link the explanations for derivatives usage 
more tightly with the theory, since firms use currency and IR derivatives for different reasons. We measure 
                                                          
5 Firms have also incurred substantial losses through misuse of derivatives. Examples of large derivatives related losses are: (i) US$1.3 
billion by Metallgesellschaft due to the use of energy derivatives and swaps; and (ii) US$1.7 billion loss by Orange County, California 
(Available at: https://goo.gl/A1x3rx).  
6 Our currency derivatives users are firms that use only currency forwards, currency rate swaps and futures, currency options and/or 
other currency derivatives and combinations. IR derivatives users are firms that use only IR swaps, IR options, IR futures, forward rate 
agreements, and/or other types of IR derivatives. This categorisation is standard in empirical work (see Borokhovich et al., 2004; 
Nelson et al., 2005; Panaretou, 2014). Using a broad grouping allows for easier explanations of relation between derivatives usage and 
monitoring mechanisms and managerial incentives (see Lel, 2012). Collectively, we refer to currency and IR users as derivatives users.  
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monitoring mechanisms using: (i) the natural logarithm of one plus the value of our own constituted CG index 
(LnCG_Index); (ii) the natural logarithm of board size (LnBoard_Size); and (iii) the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board (NED). Similar to LnBoard_Size and NED, we view the LnCG_Index as a 
proxy for the monitoring environment. Managerial incentives are measured using the book value of stock 
compensation divided by market value (Stock_CompMV), and the book value of executive compensation 
divided by market value (Executive_CompMV).  
Each set of derivatives users is benchmarked against a set of non-users that has either currency and/or IR 
exposure, but does not hedge. Indeed, our non-users specifically indicate in their financial reports that they do 
not use derivatives, despite having exposures to exchange rate and/or IR changes. The distinction between the 
types of derivatives users and non-users, and their monitoring environments is economically important in three 
respects. First, more firms use currency derivatives than IR derivatives and more large firms use derivatives 
than small firms (Bodnar et al., 1996; Panaretou, 2014). Second, the use of derivatives carries substantial 
financial risks. Indeed, UK treasury functions require authorisation from the board of directors about the type 
and amount of derivatives to use and the level of counterparty risk to accept (Grant and Marshall, 1997). The 
financial reports of many of our derivatives users indicate that their chief executive officers (CEOs) and 
internal directors actively participate in risk management decisions. This level of participation by executives 
provides ample opportunity to create an internal control environment that favours their interests. Firms that 
use derivatives are likely to have stronger monitoring mechanisms because of the additional risk associated 
with using derivatives. While non-users would also likely have monitoring mechanisms in place, we predict 
that their monitoring mechanisms will not be as strong as those of derivatives users. Finally, decisions 
regarding derivatives usage are determined endogenously, based on attributes, such as board size, board 
structure, and compensation plans. Adams et al. (2010, p. 59) make related arguments that are not associated 
with derivatives usage. 7  While we contrast the attributes of users and non-users and test them against 
theoretical predictions, the endogeneity problem does not go away for either set of firms, since managers can 
control both monitoring mechanisms and derivatives usage to achieve the desired effects. It is hard to see how 
this endogeneity problem can go away entirely (see Géczy et al., 1997), even if we use the predicted values of 
our monitoring and managerial compensation variables from instrumental variables–generalised method of 
moments (IV–GMM) estimations. We also estimate a set of IV–probit regressions. 
Using two-stage logistic regressions, we do not find a significant relation between currency derivatives usage 
and our LnCG_IndexP (baseline and interaction models).8 However, IR derivatives usage is positively related 
to LnCG_IndexP (p-value ≤ 0.01). Currency (IR) derivatives usage is also positively (negatively) related to 
LnBoard_SizeP (p-value ≤ 0.10), whereas the use of currency and IR derivatives is negatively related with 
NEDP. The negative coefficients for some of the monitoring mechanism variables are not in line with the theory. 
Since we find positive coefficients for these variables using the IV–probit regressions, we believe that some 
                                                          
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to us.  
8 We use the superscript P to denote the coefficient that is associated with the predicted values from the IV–GMM estimations.  
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of the contradictions in our results might be because the predicted values from our IV–GMM are not too 
reliable. Interacting each monitoring variable with free cash flow, Q, and Z-score typically generates negative 
coefficients across our estimation methods.9 Generally, firms with low values on these interaction terms have 
negative coefficients, although there is a small tendency for the relation to be U-shaped in high and low values. 
For IR derivatives usage, the relation between usage and these measures is also negative, suggesting risk-
shifting. In general, the monitoring mechanism variables multiplied by high and low values of variables that 
proxy for investment opportunities, e.g., free cash flow, have reducing effects on derivatives usage. Firms with 
low Q, low Z-score, and low free cash flows have poorer economic prospects than firms with high values on 
these measures. Derivatives usage tends to be negatively related with high and low values of these measures. 
The choice of compensation contracts can depend on the expected level of financial distress (Gilson and 
Vetsuypens, 1993). Smith and Stulz (1985) predict a positive relation between managerial wealth and the 
variability of firms’ expected profits. For all our estimates, the use of currency and IR derivatives is positively 
related to Stock_CompMVP and Executive_CompMVP (p-value ≤ 0.10), although currency derivatives usage 
has mixed coefficient signs in our two-stage logistic regressions. Prior studies suggest that managerial 
compensation and investment decisions are linked, causing managers to take on more risk (Tufano, 1996). We 
corroborate prior results, but only for high and low values of investment decision variables. Our results for the 
use of hedging substitutes are generally weak. 
The papers by Judge (2006), Belghitar et al. (2008), and Panaretou (2014) are the closest to ours in a UK 
context. However, these papers differ from ours in several important respects.10 While Judge (2006) and 
Belghitar et al. (2008) use three-year averages of financial data. We use up to 11 firm-year observations. Our 
approach permits more variation across firms. Similar to our study, Belghitar et al. (2008) appear to separately 
analyse currency and IR derivatives users. Panaretou (2014, p. 1,180) uses the ratio of “… the top-five insider 
holdings of common stocks to total shares …” and institutional shareholdings as CG measures. We use a 14-
binary component CG-index. We take a country-specific approach as this allows us to directly capture the 
specific attributes associated with managerial compensation plans and monitoring mechanisms. 
Theoretically, firms use currency derivatives to: (i) reduce expected tax liabilities associated with pre-tax profit 
volatility (Smith and Stulz, 1985); (ii) reduce expected investment distortion costs (Bessembinder, 1991; Froot 
et al., 1993); and (iii) reduce managerial risk aversion and enhance managerial compensation plans (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985). Similarly, firms use IR derivatives to: (i) reduce the risk of financial distress and bankruptcy 
                                                          
9 Low (High) denotes the bottom third (top third) of observations for a variable, in each sample of currency, IR, and combined 
derivatives users and non-users. 
10 Other studies that differ from ours include Bartram et al. (2009). They undertake a cross-country study that includes UK firms. Their 
paper employs financial variables for derivatives users and non-users and variables concerned with ownership concentration and 
(external) investor protection. They do not consider internal governance and board structure. Also, Borokhovich et al. (2004) examine 
IR derivatives usage for US firms. They include variables, such as board composition and structure as well as ownership structure, but 
do not consider non-users and currency derivatives users.  
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costs (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1996); and (ii) increase leverage and protect expected interest tax shields 
(Leland, 1998; Graham and Rogers, 2002). Our hypotheses relate to some of these theoretical predictions.  
The next section presents a brief overview of theoretical and empirical work from which we develop our 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the methodology and the data sets. Our empirical results are presented in 
Sections 4 and 5, and we conclude in Section 6. 
2. Background and Hypotheses 
This section presents our hypotheses. We link the hypotheses for monitoring mechanisms and managerial 
incentives with derivatives usage and explain the importance of using derivatives in investment decisions.11 
Our hypotheses are set in general terms.  
2.1. Derivatives usage and monitoring mechanisms 
Firm value, agency conflicts, and corporate performance differ between poorly and well-governed firms (see 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Hoechle et al., 2012). Relative to inside directors, outside directors have 
incentives to act and make decisions that are in the best interests of shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983). A 
larger number of NEDs does not imply greater internal control and more effective monitoring (Jensen, 1993; 
Guest, 2009), if also, the CEO’s power base increases and NEDs engage in free-riding (Adams et al., 2005; 
Faleye, 2015). Géczy et al. (2007) find that weaker firm-wide governed firms use derivatives more for 
speculative reasons than to reduce firm level risk. However, such firms have more internal monitoring and 
internal control in place to avoid potential abuses. Monitoring mechanisms can benefit directors more than 
shareholders, even in the absence of speculation. One approach is to bias the board size towards internal rather 
than external directors; another approach is to maintain CEO-chair duality. This way, internal directors and 
CEOs have more control over the extent of monitoring and the way derivatives are used to enhance their own 
interests. If monitoring mechanisms are weak, managers are more likely to use derivatives for their own benefit 
(Bartram et al., 2009; Lel, 2012). However, Borokhovich et al. (2004) find a positive relation between the 
proportion of outside directors and IR derivatives usage, indicating that outside directors actively participate 
in decisions about derivatives usage to protect shareholders’ interests. Collectively, these findings suggest that 
risk management strategies might be influenced by the monitoring mechanisms in place. Thus we hypothesise 
that: 
H1: Derivatives usage is positively related to the monitoring mechanisms within firms.  
We measure monitoring mechanisms using: (i) the natural logarithm of one plus our CG-index (LnCG_Index); 
(ii) the natural logarithm of total board membership (LnBoard_Size); and (iii) the percentage of non-executive 
directors and total number of directors (NED). Our CG-index is based on zero/one dummy variables 
comprising 14 components such as CEO-chair separation, presence/absence of a remuneration committee, and 
                                                          
11 We do not specifically establish a hypothesis for taxation. However, we use the ratio of total tax payments divided by total pre-tax 
income (TXR) to test for a negative relation between TXR and derivatives usage. Theoretically, firms use derivatives to minimisation 
tax payable (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
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so on (see Appendix II). The components of our CG-index are primarily concerned with internal monitoring.12 
This is because the UK Financial Reporting Council (2014) makes directors directly responsible for risk 
management.  
There is widespread agreement that a good set of monitoring mechanisms contains attributes that enhance 
board effectiveness. However, the choice of the particular set of monitoring mechanisms is not 
straightforward. For example, agency theory favours CEO-chair separation to control managerial self-interest 
and to reduce agency costs. The stewardship perspective supports CEO-chair duality as a way of preserving 
good stewardship and ensuring managerial control. Goyal and Park (2002) find that poorly performing CEOs 
are less likely to be dismissed if they have both CEO and Chair roles. However, high-ability CEOs may be 
awarded a combined title for good performance, meaning that CEO power is determined endogenously.13 
Board independence is not directly measurable since it depends on the balance of power between the CEO 
and the board. We see LnBoard_Size and NED as constraints on CEO power, even if they may not 
adequately proxy for the degree of CEO control. Up to a point, the benefits of large boards decrease, such 
that size outweighs the benefits of more expertise. Harris and Raviv (2008) show that shareholders benefit 
from insider-controlled boards if they are able to exploit internal information. Thus, either small or large 
boards are suitable, depending on board composition and firm characteristics (Coles et al., 2008; Han et al., 
2016). 
2.2. Managerial incentives and derivatives usage  
Theoretically, corporate hedging increases firm value to benefit shareholders, bondholders, and managers (see 
Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot et al., 1993; Leland, 1998). Hedging is positively related to managerial 
compensation plans if managers are risk-averse and compensation plans are a concave function of firm value 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985). The expected utility of risk-averse managers is significantly affected by the variability 
of the firm’s expected profits (Smith and Stulz, 1985), causing managers to hedge to protect their own wealth 
in the firm. CEOs with more equity wealth in the firm diversify more risk (May, 1995). However, Tufano 
(1996) finds that managers holding more stock options (stocks) manage less (more) risk. Remuneration 
committees are expected to have a moderating effect on pay (The Greenbury Report, 1995) and, in turn, the 
extent of risk taking. Guthrie et al. (2012) find that total CEO pay increases even in the presence of independent 
remuneration committees. The CG environment is considered to be an important mechanism to mitigate the 
excesses of executive remuneration and to reduce managerial entrenchment and agency costs (Borokhovich et 
al., 1996; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). Veprauskaitė and Adams (2013) find a negative relation between CEO 
                                                          
12 Chernenko and Faulkender (2011) consider managerial compensation plans for IR derivatives users, but do not consider monitoring 
mechanisms. Géczy et al. (1997) use managerial wealth and share option ownership to proxy for managerial incentives of users and 
non-users. Their managerial incentive measures are not significant.  
13 One can reasonably argue that existing empirical evidence does not overwhelmingly support the view that the separation of the CEO 
and Chair roles enhances corporate performance. There is weak support for the view that the choice of roles affects corporate 
performance based on industry adjusted market and accounting returns (Brickley et al., 1997). The performance of firms may become 
less variable or more variable as CEOs become more powerful (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Adams et al., 2005). Firms that 
split the role of CEO-chair following investor pressure have lower market returns and lower financial performance (Dey et al., 2011).  
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power and firm performance. However, Tan and Liu (2016) find that CEO power negatively relates to 
idiosyncratic volatility. There is limited evidence to suggest that well-governed firms use derivatives to pursue 
value-enhancing objectives rather than pursue managerial self-interest (see Huston and Stevenson, 2010; 
Allayannis et al., 2012).14 Since our firms do not engage in speculation in derivatives markets, we hypothesise 
that: 
H2: Derivatives usage is positively related to the level of managerial incentives.  
Managerial incentives are measured using: (i) stock-related compensation divided by market value 
(Stock_CompMV) multiplied by 100; (ii) executive compensation divided by market value 
(Executive_CompMV) multiplied by 100; and (iii) Stock Price_Volatility measured as the average stock price 
divided by the range of the stock’s price over the year. We do not use the value of stock option compensation 
contracts due to the large number of missing observations in our data.  
2.3. Investment distortion costs 
Investment distortion costs arise either because of cash shortages for investments (underinvestment costs) or 
the excess availability of cash (overinvestment costs). The use of derivatives is argued to reduce the cost of 
both investment distortion costs, such that managers are incentivised to take on value-enhancing projects 
(Lessard, 1991; Froot et al., 1993). The expected costs of financial distress will increase if managers do not 
accept positive NPV projects. It is relatively straightforward to think of firms with high underinvestment costs 
as pertaining to underperforming firms, such that they are characterised by low free cash flow, low Z-score 
values, and low Q and liquidity levels. In this case, information asymmetry and agency costs increase, and 
managers seek private benefits from investment decisions (Morrellec and Smith, 2007). Neither the level of 
leverage nor growth opportunities alone can adequately proxy for underinvestment costs, since firms can rely 
on internal funds in the short term. However, the monitoring mechanisms of firms can ensure that derivatives 
are used to mitigate the need for costly external financing and for firms to meet their debt obligations. Thus, 
we hypothesise that: 
H3A: Derivatives usage is positively related to measures that proxy for underinvestment costs.  
The over- and underinvestment problems reflect two extreme points on what we refer to as the leverage 
continuum. Morrellec and Smith (2007) suggest that the over- and underinvestment problems are resolved 
when firms have optimal leverage. It is difficult to determine empirically at which point this is achieved. Géczy, 
et al. (1997), Bartram et al. (2009), and others use firm leverage (Leverage) to proxy for underinvestment. We 
use both firm-specific leverage (Leverage) and the industry average leverage (IND_Avg_LEV), depending on 
our treatment for endogeneity (see Section 4). To capture the liquidity constraints imposed by underinvestment, 
                                                          
14 The UK recommended CG guidance aims to enhance the manner in which UK listed firms are governed (see The Cadbury Report, 
1992; The Greenbury Report, 1995; The Hampel Report, 1998). UK listed firms have become more compliant in adhering to the UK 
Financial Reporting Council (2015) recommendations. They states: “… full compliance by the FTSE 350 now at 61.2% and 93.5% 
complying with all but 1 or 2 provisions” (Available at: https://goo.gl/GTbf15). 
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we use interest coverage ratio (Interest_Cover), average debt to maturity (Debt_Maturity), long-term debts to 
total debts (LT Debts_Total Debts), and low free cash flow to total assets (Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets). 
Since underinvestment costs adversely impact firm value, we also test H3A using low Q (Low_Q) and low Z-
score (Low_Z-score).  
As stated before, the availability of excess free cash flow enables entrenched managers to avoid the scrutiny 
of external capital markets. This creates opportunities for managers to pursue overinvestment strategies (Froot 
et al., 1993; Tufano, 1998). Risk management can limit the available cash flows under the control of managers 
to reflect the trade-off between under- and overinvestment distortion costs (Froot et al., 1993; Tufano, 1998). 
Since risk management and the use of derivatives will reduce the availability of cash under managers’ control, 
we hypothesise: 
H3B: The use of derivatives is negatively related to measures of overinvestment costs.  
Firms with high overinvestment costs are expected to have high free cash flow, Z-score, Q, and so on. The 
high values on these measures will incentivise managers to accept projects that are not value-enhancing. 
Monitoring by external markets is likely to resolve this problem when derivatives are used, since information 
asymmetry will be reduced (Titman, 1992). Thus, to proxy for overinvestment costs, we use free cash flow to 
total assets (Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets) and high free cash flow to total assets (High_Free-Cash-
Flow_Total Assets). We also use capital expenditures to property, plant and equipment (CAP_Exped_PPE), 
capital expenditures to total sales (CAP_Exped_Total Sales), high Q (High_Q), and high Z-score (High_Z-
score). Firms with overinvestment costs are also predicted to have high values on research and development 
(R&D) to total assets (R&D_Total Assets).  
2.4. Hedging substitutes and derivatives usage  
If firms have excess free cash flow, this condition temporarily takes away the need for them to hedge in external 
markets. Indeed, “[w]hile cash-flow hedging takes away the need to obtain ‘expensive’ financing, it does so 
by eliminating the discipline that the capital markets would impose on firms attempting to fund poor projects” 
(Tufano, 1998, p. 68). This means that firms experiencing overinvestment costs will hedge using internal 
resources to avoid hedging in external markets (Lessard, 1991; Froot, et al., 1993). Both the use of hedging 
substitutes and the overinvestment problem increase agency costs as managers undertake value destroying 
projects (Lessard, 1991; Froot, et al., 1993; Stulz, 1998). Thus, we hypothesise that:15 
H4: Derivatives usage is negatively related to measures associated with hedging substitutes. 
Hedging substitutes are measured using convertible debts divided by total debts (Convertible Debts_Total 
Debts), fixed assets divided by total assets (Fixed Assets_Total Assets), current ratio (Current Ratio), the 
                                                          
15 Nance et al. (1993) predict a negative relation between derivatives usage and debt instruments. Géczy, et al. (1997, p. 1329) predict 
a positive relation between derivatives usage and convertible debts and preferred stocks. If measures, such as Current Ratio and 
LnPre_Tax_Income, capture the use of hedging substitutes, their levels will be lower since firms cannot use hedging substitutes 
indefinitely. Thus, the predicted direction will be negative. 
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natural logarithm of pre-tax income (LnPre_Tax_Income), total cash divided by total assets (Cash_Total 
Assets), and return on assets (ROA). These measures can be viewed as available resources under management’s 
control for internally funded projects (see Nance et al., 1993; Géczy, et al., 1997). As such, H4 relates to H3B.16 
3. Data and Methodology 
All the firms in our sample are UK non-financial listed firms. The firms are manually identified as derivatives 
users or non-users, using the notes in their financial reports, year by year, over the 2005 to 2015 period. The 
financial reports are available on each firm’s website and on http://www.northcote.co.uk. Key words, such as 
forwards, swaps, derivatives, and so on, are used to identify each firm’s approach to risk management. Non-
users specifically indicate that they have hedgeable exposures but do not use derivatives.17 In most cases, the 
notes in the financial reports specifically stated the risk management policies of firms with explicit statements 
as to whether the use of derivatives is allowed or forbidden. A small minority of non-users indicate that they 
have no IR exposure as they have no foreign deposits or domestic loans. We treat them as non-users with 
exposures.18 Graham and Rogers (2002, p. 824) take a similar view stating that “… we can interpret the absence 
of derivatives [in 10-K forms filed] as a choice not to use derivatives, rather than possibly indicating a lack of 
exposure to hedgeable risks.” None of our firms use derivatives for speculative reasons (see also Grant and 
Marshall, 1997, p. 198).  
There are 14 components in our CG-index (see Appendix II). These components are taken from Datastream. 
The presence or absence of each component is used to construct a broad unweighted governance index across 
each firm for each year. Since we are contrasting users and non-users, we cannot use the notional value of 
derivatives positions as in Borokhovich et al. (2004), Hentschel and Kothari (2001), and others, to characterise 
derivatives usage, as this variable does not exist for non-users.  
Our multivariate regressions seek to identify the statistical features for each group of derivatives users and 
non-users. To deal with potential endogeneity, we estimate IV–GMM regressions for each group of derivatives 
users and non-users. We prefer the GMM method to the two-stage least squares (2SLS), since the predicted 
                                                          
16 The similarity in the predicted coefficient signs of H3B (overinvestment) and H4 (hedging substitutes) needs clarification. Firms must 
have excess free cash flow, high Q, and so on, to have an overinvestment problem. Thus, an overinvestment problem would exist for 
more healthy firms with excess financial resources. Since the use of (financial) derivatives by definition exposes firms to scrutiny in 
external financial markets, they would use their excess cash flows for productive investments. As such, cash flow and liquidity will be 
lower, in line with H3B. Indeed, using risk management programmes can reduce the availability of excess resources in the hands of 
managers (Tufano, 1996). The evidence indicates that firms use IR derivatives to reduce information asymmetry and enhance credit 
quality (Titman, 1992; Simkins and Rogers, 2006). Users of hedging substitutes would use internal resources to meet the cash flow 
shortfalls associated with the negative effects of currency and IR fluctuations on operating cash flows. Froot et al (1993) predict that 
firms cannot use hedging substitutes indefinitely, meaning that they will eventually fail if they do not hedge. Thus, the predicted 
coefficient sign for both H3B and H4 is negative. 
17 Bango Plc’s Annual Report (2011, p. 14) states “… the Group’s activities expose it to some financial risks. The Group monitors 
these risks but does not consider it necessary to use any derivative financial instruments to hedge these risks.” 
18 Augean PLC Annual Report and Accounts (2015, p. 75) states, “… the Group’s financial liabilities include trade payables, debt and 
finance liabilities. Trade payables are not interest bearing and are recognised initially at fair value and carried at amortised cost. Debt 
is initially recognised at fair value less transaction costs and carried at amortised cost. The Group’s policy is that no trading in financial 
instruments or derivatives shall be undertaken.” 
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values under 2SLS may not be efficient even if they are consistent (see Green, 1990, p. 603). The GMM 
provides reliable estimates for inferences from most types of data sets (Hansen, 1982).  
We consider LnCG_Index, LnBoard_Size, NED, StockCom_MV, ExecutiveCom_MV and Leverage to be 
endogenous in our estimations. This is for the following reasons: (i) monitoring mechanisms, such as 
LnCG_Index and LnBoard_Size, are determined by managers; and (ii) managerial compensation plans that are 
a convex function of firm value incentivise managers to take more risk (see Smith and Stulz, 1985). We treat 
firm Leverage as endogenous since firms hedge to reduce the probability of financial distress and bankruptcy 
costs (Smith and Stulz, 1985), and Brockman et al. (2010) show that short-term debt users reduce the agency 
costs arising from the risk associated with executive compensation. Indeed, Cole et al. (2006) find a strong 
causal relation between the structure of CEO compensation, investment and debt polices, and firm risk. Finally, 
Morrellec and Smith (2007, p.3) make it clear that the over- and underinvestment problems are resolved when 
“… optimal leverage reflects a trade-off between under- and overinvestment costs.” Therefore, our full IV–
GMM equation for each set of derivatives users and non-users is:  
(𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
= 𝜇1 + 𝜆1(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆2(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜆3(𝑍‐ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆4(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜆5(𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒‐ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ‐ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆6(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜆7(𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝑃𝑃𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆8(𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜆9(𝑅&𝐷_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆10(𝑄)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆11(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜆12(𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆13(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆14(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜆15(𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆16(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆17(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜆18(𝑇𝑋𝑅)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + ((𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
= 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠) + 𝜉𝑖,𝑡 . 
(1) 
In Eq. (1), µ1 and ξi,t are, respectively, the intercept and error terms. YEAR and INDUSTRY are included to 
prevent the results being driven by time series and industry effects, respectively. The remaining variables are 
defined in Appendices I and III. Our IVs are based on yearly averages of financial variables over five broad 
industry sectors. We do not know a priori the exact number of IVs to use; so we choose from a list of 11 IVs. 
On average, five to seven IVs are needed. The chosen IVs are the ones that generate estimates that are free of 
model specification problems, e.g., endogeneity. 
To deal with the problem of endogeneity in our logistic regressions, we estimate a reduced version of Eq. (1) 
as follows: 
(𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑎1 + 𝑏1(𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝑃𝑃𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏2(𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑑_ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏3(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑏4(𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑏5(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + ((𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 . 
(2) 
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In Eq. (2), εi,t is the error term. The predicted values of each monitoring and compensation variable from Eq. 
(2) are incorporated into each logistic regression.19 We use a reduced version of Eq. (1), since the full IV–
GMM generated poor predicted values.20 We prefer the logistic regression relative to the IV–probit regression 
since the logistic regression performs better by capturing observations in the tails of the empirical distribution. 
However, the IV–probit regression has the advantage that the endogeneity problem can be dealt with in one 
estimation.  
An empirical model does not exist for the relation between derivatives usage and monitoring mechanisms, 
managerial compensation, and our explanatory variables.21 So, we justify using Eq. (2) as follows. Following 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Masulis et al. (2007), and others, firms with weaker CG undertake inefficient 
investment decisions that contribute to capital destruction. Furthermore, Chen et al. (2010) show that firms 
improve their governance structure before seeking external finance. Ryan and Wiggins (2002), for example, 
relate managerial remuneration to investment opportunities. Thus, measures such as CAP_Exped_PPE, 
CAP_Exped_Total Sales, and Dividend per Share (in Eq. (2)) are likely to proxy for investment opportunities. 
Related evidence links board size and NEDs to governance and financial performance (Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2007; Faleye, 2015). Firms hedge to preserve growth options, dividends, and sales (Lessard, 1991; 
Froot et al., 1993). Finally, derivatives usage is related to size (Bodnar et al., 1996; Panaretou, 2014), which is 
measured using LnMarket Value and LnTotal Sales.  
The logistic regression is specified as follows:  
𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1(𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
𝑃
+ 𝛽2(𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐿𝐸𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑍‐ 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7(𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒‐ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ‐ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽9(𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝑃𝑃𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10(𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽11(𝑅&𝐷_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12(𝑄)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽14(𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽16(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽17(𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽18(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽19(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽20(𝑇𝑋𝑅)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + Ϛ𝑖,𝑡 . 
(3) 
𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
∗  is an unobservable latent variable that captures the probability of a firm using/not using a particular 
set of derivatives. That is, 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
∗ = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
∗ > 0
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
∗ ≤ 0
. ζi,t is the error term. The superscript P denotes the 
predicted values from Eq. (2). 
                                                          
19 Wooldridge (2010) suggests the use of predicted values to deal with endogeneity. Géczy, et al. (1997) also use predicted values in 
their logistic regression.  
20 An anonymous reviewer suggested that the full model (inclusive of year and industry effects) would likely generate better predicted 
values. We run Eq. (1) and several of its reduced versions. The more complex the specification, the greater the tendency for the logistic 
regressions to generate excessively large coefficients and wrong coefficient signs. The inclusion of year and industry dummies in any 
version of Eq. (1) also created estimation problems for the two-stage logistic regressions. Evidence in the economics literature shows 
that complicated models generate poor forecasts relative to simple models (Meese and Rogoff, 1983; Liu et al., 1994). These arguments 
justify our use of Eq. (2) to generate the predicted values for the two-stage logistic regressions. 
21 Models of capital structure include some of the explanatory variable we use in Eq. (2). Mande et al. (2012) use a similar approach 
to generate predicted values for their CG indices.  
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Finally, the IV–probit regression is stated as follows: 
𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
∗∗ = 𝑐1 + 𝑐2(𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐴𝑣𝑔_𝐿𝐸𝑉)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐3(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑐4(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐5(𝑍˗𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐6(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡_𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑐7(𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒‐ 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ‐ 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐8(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇_𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑐9(𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝑃𝑃𝐸)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐10(𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑑_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑐11(𝑅&𝐷_𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐12(𝑄)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐13(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑐14(𝐿𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐15(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐16(𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑐17(𝐿𝑛𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐18(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐19(𝐿𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑐20𝑇𝑋𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌
+ (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑚 𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡
= 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 ) + 𝜈𝑖,𝑡. 
 
 
 
 
(4) 
In Eq. (4), 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
∗∗ is also an unobservable latent variable; c1 and νi,t are, respectively, the intercept and error 
term. The probit model relies on the standard normal distribution since the probability of 𝑈𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
∗∗ is computed 
using a cumulative normal probability function.22 In Eqs. (3) and (4), IND_Avg_LEV proxies for firm leverage 
to reduce potential endogeneity problems. We use IND_Avg_LEV since individual firms are unlikely to 
influence this measure to give rise to an endogeneity problem. We trimming the top and bottom 1% of the 
observations for each variable to remove exceptionally large/small values for all our estimates, and use robust 
standard errors when estimating Eqs. (1) to (4).23 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Distribution of derivatives users and non-users 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the distribution of users and non-users year by year. The sample of combined 
derivatives users (currency, IR, and commodity) increases from 105 in 2005 to 126 firms in 2015, reaching a 
peak of 136 firms in 2014; non-users peak in 2012 (81 firms). The majority of firms use several combinations 
of derivatives. For these firms, between 82.58% (109 out of 132 firms; in 2008) and 87.69% (114 out of 130; 
in 2010), mostly use currency derivatives with less regular use of IR and/or commodity derivatives. Also, 
between 54.39% (62 out of 114; in 2006) and 59.69% (77 out of 129; in 2012) of the firms, mostly use IR 
derivatives together with less regular use of currency and commodity derivatives. The table also shows the 
distributions for the clean samples of currency and IR derivative users on which we base our main results. 
Between 37.21% (48 out of 129; in 2012) and 42.11% (48 out of 114; in 2006) of derivatives users only use 
currency derivatives. Similarly, between 10.08% (13 out of 129; in 2012) and 13.64% (18 out of 132; in 2008) 
of derivatives users use only IR derivatives. Far fewer firms use commodity derivatives. Since we estimate 
logistic regressions, our sample size is unlikely to affect the reliability of our estimations.24 
                                                          
22 The probit and logistic regressions have different specifications for the distribution of the disturbance term. The disturbance term of 
the logistic regression model follows the standard logistic distribution, whereas the disturbance term of the probit regression model 
follows the standard normal distribution. Both distributions are very close in the shape of their distribution functions, except at the tails. 
The logistic regression will always provide a better fit to non-normal distributions relative to the probit model since it captures the 
observations in the tails of non-normal distributions. 
23 All our estimations are performed in StataIC 15 and we specify our equations in a related way. 
24 Our sub-samples of derivatives users are unbalanced relative to non-users. However, the smaller sample size of IR derivatives users 
is unlikely to affect the reliability of the logistic regression estimates. Indeed, Owen (2007, p. 761) shows that “… under mild conditions, 
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[Table 1, about here] 
Our users and non-users are from nine industry sectors (Panel B of Table 1). Industrials have the largest number 
of firm-year observations (498), followed by Consumer Services (292) and Consumer Goods (179). Our 
descriptive statistics show that derivatives users have larger average values for the monitoring mechanism and 
managerial incentive measures than non-users. Derivatives users also have larger average values for size and 
leverage measures compared with non-users. The Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney statistic confirms that the two 
groups of users and non-users have different medians. The Spearman rank correlation coefficients for the 
explanatory variables for each set of firms give us no cause for concern. All results not fully presented are 
available from the authors.  
4.2. IV–GMM estimates based on the full model  
Table 2 shows the coefficient estimates using the full IV–GMM (Eq. 1). For each IV–GMM estimation, we 
rely on the following model specification tests for their validity: (i) the Hansen J statistic to test for over-
identifying restrictions; (ii) the Hayashi C test for endogeneity; and (iii) the F-statistic to test the correlation 
between the IVs and the endogenous variables (weak instruments). The C and J statistics indicate no concern 
over endogeneity and over-identification, respectively. The p-values are larger than 0.10. The F-statistic has 
p-values of less than 0.10, indicating that the instruments are not weak (see Table 2). These specification tests 
give us confidence in our estimates. 
[Table 2, about here] 
Table 2 shows that the magnitude of estimated coefficients varies across users and non-users. Leverage is 
negatively related to NED for currency derivatives users (p-value ≤ 0.10). Leverage and LnBoard Size are 
negatively related to IR derivatives users (p-value ≤ 0.05). These measures are not significant for combined 
users and non-users. Thus, using combined users as a group neutralises the relation between Leverage and 
LnBoard Size. Leverage is also insignificant for all managerial compensation variables. This latter result 
contradicts the predicted relation between leverage and managerial compensation (see Calcagno and 
Renneboog, 2007).  
Monitoring mechanisms (LnCG_Index, LnBoard Size and NED) have mixed coefficient signs for 
EBIT_Market Value (p-value ≤ 0.10). Q has positive coefficients for all users (p-value ≤ 0.10), but a negative 
coefficient for non-users in respect of Stock_CompMV (p-value ≤ 0.10). The coefficients for LnMarket Value 
are positive for all groups of derivatives users (p-value ≤ 0.01) in LnCG_Index; they are insignificant for non-
users (p-value ≥ 0.01). LnMarket Value has positive coefficients in LnBoard Size for all groups of firms, except 
for currency derivatives users (p-value ≤ 0.10). The result for currency derivatives users is unexpected. Finance 
theory predicts a positive relation between managerial wealth and the variability of firms’ expected profits 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985). However, managerial compensation (Executive_CompMV and Stock_CompMV) is 
                                                          
the intercept [in the logistic regression] diverges as expected, but the rest of the coefficient vector approaches a non-trivial and useful 
limit”, such that the use of relatively small samples does not affect the coefficient estimates.  
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negatively related to EBIT_Market Value (p-value ≤ 0.01) in six out the eight estimates (p-value ≤ 0.10). Thus, 
managerial compensation has a negative impact for all groups of firms suggesting that managerial 
compensation increases when market value decreases, even for derivatives users. Hermalin (2005) argues that 
CEO pay positively relates to tighter CG, due to greater board diligence and the tendency to recruiting external 
CEOs. While the positive coefficients for LnMarket Value in LnCG_Index and LnBoard Size suggest that 
market value increases, the negative relation for LnMarket Value in Executive_CompMV seems to be counter-
intuitive. It is possible that CEOs command a risk premium in the presence of declining market values.  
4.3. Logistic regressions 
Using Eq. (3), we estimate the two-stage logistic regressions for currency and IR derivatives usage. The 
predicted values for our endogenous variables are obtained from the IV–GMM estimates of Eq. (2). These IV–
GMM estimates are not shown to save space. However, they satisfy specification conditions of no endogeneity 
and overriding restrictions (p-value ≥ 0.10) and no weak instruments (p-value ≤ 0.10). All our variables are 
defined in Appendices I and III.  
[Table 3, about here] 
Table 3 and 4 show that the goodness-of-fit of the logistic regressions are adequate based on Pearson χ2 tests. 
The Wald χ2 statistic is significant in all cases (p-value ≤ 0.01), indicating that all the variables in the models 
besides the constant, have explanatory power. Across all estimates, between 74.16% (Model 4A, Table 3) and 
91.62% (Model 8B, Table 4) of the firm-year observations are correctly classified. The percentage correctly 
classified outperforms a naïve proportional chance model (see Joy and Tollefson, 1975) at a 1% level. The 
year dummies for 2007 and 2009 are always positive, but not necessarily significant (p-value ≥ 0.10). Indeed, 
the notes in the financial reports of some of our firms indicated that the use of derivatives increased during the 
crisis period. The industry dummy variables are significant only in a few cases (p-value ≤ 0.10). For the results 
that follow, we denote our baseline models as Model 1A, Model 2A, and so on. Models with interaction terms 
are designated, Model 1B, Model 2B, and so on. 
4.3.1. Monitoring mechanisms and currency derivatives usage 
Models 1A to 3B (in Table 3) show the results for currency derivatives usage using the monitoring variables. 
The LnCG_IndexP coefficients are not significant (Model 1A and 1B; p-value ≥ 0.10). While the coefficients 
for LnBoard_SizeP are positive, only the baseline coefficient is significant (Model 2A; p-value ≤ 0.01). Related 
work indicates that large boards are value-enhancing (see Faleye, 2015); so we find some support for this view. 
Both NEDP coefficients are negative (Models 3A and 3B; p-value ≤ 0.05). Overall, we conclude that there is 
not enough evidence to support H1.  
The positive coefficient for LnBoard_SizeP means that as the number of directors increases the likelihood of 
firms using currency derivatives increases. In contrast, the negative NEDP coefficients suggest that as the 
percentage of NEDs increases less derivatives are used. By implication, NEDs are accepting more risk on 
behalf of shareholders. The marginal effects (MEs) for the NEDP are modest (p-value ≤ 0.05)––between –
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0.053 (Model 3A) and –0.030 (Model 3B), indicating that the predicted probability of NEDs influencing usage 
is not strong.  
CEO-chair separation is a binary variable in our data. We do not estimate predicted values for CEO-chair 
separation. This is because of the estimation problems associated with obtaining reliable predicted values for 
binary variables. However, the binary value for CEO-chair separation is included in the LnCG_IndexP, but 
shows no obvious effect. Up to 74.86% of our firm-year observations comprise currency derivatives users that 
have CEO-chair duality. While it is likely that CEO-chair duality impacts our results via LnBoard_SizeP to 
give a positive effect, boards with CEO-chair separation do not necessarily have greater effectiveness (see 
Brickley et al., 1997; Dey et al., 2011). The ME for LnBoard_SizeP is 0.539 (Model 1A; p-value ≤ 0.01). This 
value is larger (in absolute value) compared with those of NEDP. Thus, the predicted probability of 
LnBoard_SizeP affecting derivatives usage is strong. As such, a unit increase in LnBoard_SizeP increases 
derivatives usage by a factor of 25.154, i.e., e3.225.  
Bebchuk et al. (2009) and Chang and Zhang (2015) report a negative relation between entrenchment and firm 
value, implying that entrenched managers are more likely to undertake value-destroying corporate policies. 
One way to relate our results to their finding is to examine the role of monitoring mechanisms when directors 
have influence over investment decisions in the presence of derivatives use. To do so, we separately interact 
Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets, Q, and Z-score with our monitoring and managerial compensation variables. 
Therefore, we sort the observations for each financial variable to capture the top and bottom third of the 
observations. We apply a value of one to each of the top and bottom third of the observations of each variable; 
zero otherwise. That way, we may capture a link with investment distortion costs. We assume that the strongest 
evidence for over- and underinvestment costs is in the top (bottom) third of each variable.  
Table 3 shows that only LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Z-score has a positive coefficient (Model 2B; p-value ≤ 0.01). 
The positive coefficient indicates that Low Z-score firms in LnBoard_SizeP use more currency derivatives. 
Low_Z-score firms are more risky than High_Z-score firms; they are predicted to use more derivatives. In 
contrast, LnBoard_SizeP×High_Z-score has a negative coefficient (Model 2B; p-value ≤ 0.01), thus causing 
the link between board size and Z-score to be U-shaped in relation to usage. That is, board size positively 
influences currency derivatives usage for Low_Z-score firms, but negatively influences currency derivatives 
usage for High Z-score firms. High Z-score firms may reduce derivatives usage to increase overinvestment 
costs, particularly if executives stand to benefit more than shareholders in investment decisions.  
The remaining coefficients for our monitoring mechanisms with interaction terms are negative (Models B1, 
2B and B3; p-value ≤ 0.01). Derivatives usage is negatively related to LnCGP_Index×Low_Z-score, 
LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Q and NEDP×Low_Q (p-value ≤ 0.10). Q proxies for investment opportunities, whereas 
Z-score proxies for the probability for financial distress. The use of derivatives is predicted to increase firm 
value for firms with low values on both measures. Large boards have increased problems of coordination and 
free-riding, implying that small boards may be more effective (Jensen, 1993). Since low Q firms are more 
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likely to be undervalued relative to high Q firms, the need for capital investments would be more pressing. 
Marsden and Prevost (2005) report, however, that high growth firms with a higher proportion of NEDs use 
less financial derivatives amongst New Zealand firms. They indicate that the negative relation is due to the 
new Companies and Financial Reporting Acts of 1993, which increased the personal liability of directors for 
bad investment decisions. UK NEDs and boards have been given increased financial and risk management 
responsibilities over the years, under various codes of practice and financial reporting requirements. It is 
possible that the negative relations reflect a decrease in currency derivatives usage to a more optimal level.  
4.3.2. Managerial compensation and currency derivatives usage  
May (1995) and Tufano (1996) find that utility maximising managers tend to pursue risk-reducing strategies 
when their personal non-diversifiable wealth is tied to firm value. Thus, managerial compensation is positively 
related to currency derivatives usage based on H2. Table 3 shows that Stock_CompMV
P has only one positive 
and significant coefficient (Model 4B; p-value ≤ 0.05), partly in support of H2. The Executive_CompMV
P 
coefficients are both negative (Models 5A and 5B; p-value ≤ 0.10). The explanation for the mixed result is not 
certain since both variables proxy for compensation plans. If executives have more control over risk 
management strategy than external directors and external directors adopt an ineffective monitoring role 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Franks et al., 2001), then the negative coefficients may be capturing a reduction 
in risk management programmes to benefit executive compensation plans, with Executive_CompMVP having 
a negative effect. Stock_CompMVP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets and Stock_CompMVP×Low_Z-score 
also have negative coefficients (Panel 4B; p-value ≤ 0.05). This suggests that the positive coefficient for 
Stock_CompMVP may not be too reliable. Theoretically, low free cash flow and Z-score firms should increase 
derivatives usage (Lessard, 1991; Tufano, 1998). We also find a U-shaped relation for derivatives usage and 
Executive_CompMVP in Z-score, such that the coefficient for Executive_CompMVP×High_Z-score is positive 
(Model 5B; p-value ≤ 0.10) and the coefficient for Executive_CompMVP×Low_Z-score is negative (Model 5B; 
p-value ≤ 0.05). Overall, managerial compensation appears to lead to more risk-taking, with low Z-score firms 
being more strongly associated with a reduction in derivatives use.  
Several theories link executive compensation to the ability of managers to extract economic rent (see Bebchuk 
and Fried, 2003). The ability to extract economic rents will be higher in poorly governed firms. If the use of 
derivatives also increases firm value, executive compensation will positively correlate to measures, such as Q 
and Z-score since, theoretically, derivatives usage benefits both managers and shareholders (Smith and Stulz, 
1985). While the negative coefficients for our investment measures suggest an environment where financial 
risk taking increases, we find little evidence to suggest that managerial wealth is determined in an environment 
where risk reduction appears to be the norm. Tufano (1996) and Schrand and Unal (1998) report that managers 
holding common stocks manage more risk compared with those holding stock options. Data unavailability 
prevents us from examining the effects on investment distortion costs when managers hold stock options. We 
note, however, that the coefficients for Stock Price_Volatility are consistently negative across all our 
regressions, but only significant in LnBoard_Size (Model 2B; p-value ≤ 0.05). 
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4.3.3. Underinvestment and financial distress and currency derivatives usage 
H3A predicts a positive relation between currency derivatives usage and underinvestment costs. Using 
IND_Avg_LEV to proxy for firm leverage, derivatives usage is negatively related to IND_Avg_LEV (p-value 
≤ 0.10). The negative coefficients are significant across most of our monitoring and management compensation 
variables, causing us to reject H3A. Thus, on average, currency derivatives usage decreases with IND_Avg_LEV 
(leverage). However, Purnanandam’s (2008) theoretical model predicts a positive relation for moderately 
leveraged firms and a negative relation for highly leveraged firms, since highly leveraged firms take longer to 
improve their future prospects. Thus, our result is not entirely out of line with this theoretical prediction, 
although we have not determined the extent of high or low leverage across our firms. EBIT_Market Value 
always has negative and significant coefficients (p-value ≤ 0.01). Nance et al. (1993) use EBIT_Interest 
Expense to proxy for leverage. They find a negative and insignificant coefficient. Low_Q is positively related 
to currency derivatives usage in LnBoard_SizeP (Model 2B; p-value ≤ 0.05), despite being negative when 
interacted with LnBoard_SizeP (Model 2B). The negative coefficient for LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Q captures 
usage for highly distressed firms. The coefficients for Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets are positive (p-value 
≤ 0.05) across all estimates, except for LnBoard_SizeP where the coefficient is insignificant. This result 
provides support for H3A. The U-shaped relation for Z-score in LnBoard_Size
P is worth a further consideration 
(Model 2B; p-value ≤ 0.01). Perhaps, this suggests that currency derivatives usage is less of a critical issue for 
under-performing firms. This view is, of course, inconsistent with the theory (Smith and Stulz, 1985). Currency 
derivatives usage is negatively related to CAP_Exped_Total Sales and Dividend per Share (p-value ≤ 0.01), 
thereby allowing us to reject H3A. 
4.3.4. Overinvestment and currency derivatives usage 
Following Tufano (1998) and Stulz (1996), the availability of free cash flow can cause managers to accept 
negative NPV projects. Table 3 shows that the coefficients for Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets are typically 
negative (p-value ≤ 0.10), giving some support for H3B. The CAP_Exped_PPE coefficients are also negative 
in NEDP and Executive_CompMVP (p-value ≤ 0.10). In general, these results support H3B in the sense that 
derivatives usage decreases for these measures. Currency derivatives usage is positively (negatively) related 
to High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets (Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets) for the most part, giving rise to 
the U-shaped effect predicted by H3A and H3B. This is an interesting result for investment distortion costs, 
which validates the theory.  
Important links can be drawn between over/underinvestment costs and measures based on growth opportunities. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) find that US derivatives users have higher Q and higher capital expenditures to 
sales ratios. Table 3 shows that the R&D_Total Assets coefficients are negative across all estimates (p-value ≤ 
0.01), indicating that firms with R&D spending are less likely to use derivatives. This finding might hold if 
such firms also have excess free cash flows to fund the decline in cash flow associated with the failure to use 
derivatives. However, since our High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets coefficients are also negative, there 
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seems to be a role for using currency derivatives to protect available cash flows. This demonstrates some of 
the difficulties in testing H3B.  
4.3.5. Hedging substitutes and currency derivatives usage  
Géczy et al. (1997) point out that the costs of financial distress can affect the debt choices of firms. Derivatives 
usage is negatively related to long-term debt if debt levels increase, due to risk-shifting. Froot et al. (1993) 
predict a positive relation between currency derivatives usage and liquidity, since hedging would preserve 
liquidity for new investments and dividend payments. Using hedging substitutes negates the need to use 
derivatives such that the relation between hedging substitutes and derivatives usage is negative. Table 3 shows 
that our proxies for hedging substitutes are not significant, except for LnPre_Tax_Income in NEDP in some 
cases (p-value ≤ 0.01). Even so, these coefficients carry the wrong predicted sign. Thus, we do not find support 
for H4. While we do not establish hypotheses for taxation and firm size, it is useful to note that the TXR 
coefficients are insignificant, whereas the LnMarket Value and LnTotal Assets coefficients are positive when 
significant (p-value ≤ 0.10). LnMarket Value and LnTotal Assets proxy for size. Thus, these findings are in 
line with previous results (El-Masry, 2006). 
4.4. IR derivatives usage  
This sub-section presents the results for IR derivatives usage. Our baseline models are Model 6A, Model 7A, 
etc. Similarly, the models with interaction terms are Model 6B, Model 7B, and so forth. 
4.4.1. Monitoring mechanisms and IR derivatives usage  
Table 4 shows that, unlike the case of currency derivatives usage, the LnCG_IndexP coefficients are positive 
and significant (Models 6A and 6B; p-value ≤ 0.01), whereas LnBoard_SizeP has a negative coefficient 
(Models 7A; p-value ≤ 0.10). Thus, the results for currency and IR derivatives users have different coefficient 
signs. However, for IR derivatives users, NEDP has a negative coefficient (Model 8A; p-value ≤ 0.01), in line 
with the result for currency derivatives usage. Inside boards may choose to reduce derivatives usage if they 
dominate outside boards. However, the coefficient sign is consistent across both LnBoard_SizeP and NEDP. 
This result is not surprising since prior studies argue that CG in the UK is characterised as an environment 
where managers have a high level of discretion because of limited external discipline imposed by capital 
markets (Franks et al., 2001; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). Our result for NEDs contrasts with that of Borokhovich 
et al. (2004) for US firms. They suggest that NEDs participate in IR risk management to increase IR derivatives 
usage. While UK bankruptcy codes favour creditors much more than shareholders (Franks et al., 1996), this 
does not seem to lead to a strong focus on using IR derivatives. Thus, overall, we find very limited support for 
H1. We note that the negative effect for LnBoard_Size
P is relatively small, thereby generating a log odds ratio 
of 0.014, i.e., e–4.263 against a log odds ratio of 0.787, i.e., e–0.239 for NEDP. 
 [Table 4, about here] 
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The contrasting coefficient signs for LnBoard_SizeP with respect to currency and IR derivatives usage may 
also suggest that UK board of directors assess the impacts of IR and currency risks differently. Our sample 
covers a period of very low IRs for the most part, with very little variability. In contrast, currency rates have 
had a lot of variability in recent years. Thus, currency fluctuations may cause more concerns for UK boards 
than IR fluctuations. Survey evidence also shows that a larger proportion of firms hedge currency exposure 
than IR exposure (see Bodnar et al., 1998; Panaretou, 2014). These factors may therefore contribute to variation 
in the results.  
Advocates of good governance argue that boards, made up of a large proportion of NEDs, ensure that more 
pressure is put on internal boards to act in shareholders’ best interest (see Fama and Jensen, 1983). Both the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (2002) and the UK Financial Reporting Council (2014) specify that audit committees 
comprise entirely of independent outside directors, with at least one member with recent and relevant financial 
experience.25 This suggests that NEDs are likely to have knowledge of the associated financial risk. Coles et 
al. (2008) show that the Q measure is U-shaped in board size, such that large boards enhance value in complex 
organisations, whereas small boards are more appropriate for simple organisations. Our data does not allow us 
to assess the management skills of inside directors or NEDs. However, in simple terms, inside directors will 
require more specialist risk management skills for day-to-day risk management. Furthermore, NEDs may lack 
information about the firm’s risks to influence treasury management strategy. Therefore, NEDs may be willing 
to undertake a less confrontation monitoring role, which in turn imposes limited discipline on inside directors 
(see also, Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Franks et al., 2001). This may explain the similarity in the coefficient 
signs for LnBoard_SizeP and NEDP. Alternatively, inside boards may simply be under-hedging to enhance 
their own interest. In theory, compensation contracts can be designed to depend on firm value in the presence 
of hedging (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Except for LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets, all the coefficients for the interaction terms 
are negative when significant (Model 7B; p-value ≤ 0.10).26 Unlike the results for currency derivatives usage, 
we have no evidence of a U-shaped relation between IR derivatives usage and our monitoring variables. The 
firms still reduce IR derivatives in terms of the investment measures. For example, IR derivatives usage is 
negatively related to both LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Q and LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Z-score (Model 7B; p-value ≤ 
0.05). The coefficients for NEDP×Low_Q and NEDP×Low_Z-score are both negative (Model 8B; p-value ≤ 
0.05). Theoretically, Low_Q and Low_Z-score firms are more risky and should use more derivatives (see Smith 
and Stulz, 1985). We rule out potential speculative activities by our sample firms, since many of their financial 
reports state that speculation in risk management is forbidden.  
                                                          
25 One of the responsibilities of the audit committee is “… to review the company’s internal financial controls and, unless expressly 
addressed by a separate board risk committee composed of independent directors, or by the board itself, to review the company’s 
internal control and risk management systems” (The UK Financial Reporting Council, 2014, p. 23). 
26 In some cases, we were unable to obtain convergence for our logistic regressions when High_Z-score was included in the estimation. 
Correspondingly, we excluded variables that interact with High_Z-score for these estimations due to the failure of the model to 
convergence.  
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4.4.2. Managerial compensation and IR derivatives usage  
Table 3 shows that IR derivatives usage positively relates to both Stock_CompMVP and Executive_CompMVP 
(Models 9A to 10A and 9B to 10B; p-value ≤ 0.01), in support of H2. This finding is in line with theoretical 
and empirical studies. That is, Stulz (1984) predicts that utility maximising managers will increase hedging 
when compensation contracts are linked to firm value, and Schrand and Unal (1998) find that US firms use 
more IR derivatives when managerial wealth is tied to firm value. The coefficients for 
Stock_CompMVP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets and Stock_CompMVP×High_Q are negative (Model 
9B; p-value ≤ 0.10). Similarly, Executive_CompMVP ×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Asset is negative (Model 
10B; p-value ≤ 0.05). However, Executive_CompMVP ×High_Q is negative, whereas Executive_CompMVP 
×Low_Q is positive (Model 10B; p-value ≤ 0.01), giving rise to a U-shaped relation in usage.  
4.4.3. Underinvestment and financial distress and IR derivatives usage  
Table 4 shows that IR derivatives usage is positively related to IND_Avg_LEV, only in respect of the 
managerial compensation variables (p-value ≤ 0.10; Table 4). This finding supports H3A. The positive relation 
contrasts with the negative relation for currency derivatives usage. However, Leland (1998) and Graham and 
Rogers (2002) report that firms use IR derivatives to increase leverage. Furthermore, the Titman (1992) model 
demonstrates how the availability of IR swaps affects the choice between short- and long-term borrowings. 
However, usage only seems to be influenced by leverage in the context of managerial compensation plans. The 
failure to find significant coefficients for our monitoring mechanism variables may be due to our use of 
industry average leverage. However, the Debt_Maturity coefficients are positive in all cases (p-value ≤ 0.10), 
in support of an increase in the debt structure. The negative coefficients for Interest_Cover and Z-score (p-
value ≤ 0.10) are also in line with the result for Debt_Maturity. Low_Q is positive (p-value ≤ 0.10) in 
LnBoard_SizeP and NEDP, but negative in Executive_CompMVP in line with the above results. 
4.4.4. Overinvestment and IR derivatives usage  
IR derivatives usage is negatively related to Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets in LnBoard_SizeP and NEDP (p-
value ≤ 0.10), in support for H3B. The coefficients for High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets are not significant. 
The CAP_Exped_PPE coefficients are negative for only Stock_CompMVP (p-value ≤ 0.01). If managers see 
stock compensation as an indicator of their wealth in the firm, then the negative coefficient for 
CAP_Exped_PPE is unexpected, since high levels of capital expenditures suggest the exploitation of 
investment opportunities. However, the negative coefficient may indicate a reduction in IR derivative usage 
due to overinvestment costs. High_Q is positively related for NEDP and managerial compensation (p-value ≤ 
0.05), contrary to our prediction for H3B. Overall, the support for H3B is not too strong. 
4.4.5. Hedging substitutes and IR derivatives usage  
In general, the results do not support H4. The coefficients for Current Ratio, LnPre_Tax_Income and ROA are 
typically positive when significant (p-value ≤ 0.10). If firms use hedging substitutes, they will rely less on 
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derivatives. The use of hedging substitutes allows firms to place less reliance on external markets and this 
enables them to pursue overinvestment strategies.  
5. IV–probit regressions  
We now present the findings based on the IV–probit regressions (see Eq. (4)). The IVs used are shown in Panel 
B of Appendix I. We settle on a given set of IVs as long as the p-value for the Wald χ2 statistic for exogeneity 
is less than 0.10. We also use the general to specific methodology (see Pagan, 1987) to reduce the number of 
coefficients with insignificant year and industry effects, as long as the -2 log likelihood ratio is minimised and 
the Wald χ2 statistic for the goodness of fit of the model remains significant. The use of fixed effect dummies 
in IV–probit models are known to cause estimation problems. So, we settled on one or two year and industry 
dummies, using the general to specific methodology as a guide. Across our IV–probit regressions, the number 
of firm-year observations that are correctly classified is in the range of 73.29% (Model 11A, Table 5) to 95.42% 
(Model 17B, Table 6). The classificatory efficiency of the IV–probit models outperform the naïve proportional 
chance model at less than a 1% level. The Wald χ2 statistic also rejects the null hypothesis that all the slope 
coefficients are jointly zero (p-value ≤ 0.01).  
5.1. Currency derivatives usage 
Table 5 shows the coefficient estimates for currency derivatives usage. The coefficients for monitoring 
mechanisms are consistently positive and significant (p-value ≤ 0.10; Models 11A to 13A and 11B to 13B). 
These results give strong support for H1, unlike those of the two-stage logistic regressions. As stated before, 
the contradictory results under the two-stage logistic regressions may be due to the inability of the IV–GMM 
to generate reliable predicted values. Under the IV–probit regressions, LnBoard_Size seems to have the 
greatest influence on currency derivatives usage compared with LnCG_Index and NED. Indeed, LnBoard_Size 
has a coefficient of 2.005 (Model 12A; p-value ≤ 0.10), compared with 1.071 (Model 11A; p-value ≤ 0.01) for 
LnCG_Index and 0.084 (Model 13A; p-value ≤ 0.01) for NED. The stronger influence of LnBoard_Size is 
consistent with the result for currency derivatives usage (see Table 3). 
[Table 5, about here] 
Interacting the monitoring mechanism variables with our investment opportunity measures generates negative 
coefficients in all cases. Most of the negative coefficients are significant (p-value ≤ 0.10). For example, the 
coefficients for both LnBoard_Size×High_Q and LnBoard_Size×Low_Q are –4.733 and –3.188, respectively 
(Model 12B; p-value ≤ 0.05). This means that both High_Q and Low_Q firms (in LnBoard_Size) reduce 
currency derivatives usage. The result for LnBoard_Size×Low_Q is in line with those of the two-stage logistic 
regressions, although the coefficient for LnBoard_Size×High_Q is not significant for this estimation method. 
Based on the magnitudes of both coefficients in Table 5, there is some tendency for High_Q firms (in 
LnBoard_Size) to decrease currency derivatives usage more than Low_Q firms (all else being equal).  
The coefficients for Stock_CompMV and Executive_CompMV are also positive (p-value ≤ 0.01), in support of 
H2. These coefficients are larger than those of monitoring mechanisms. Interacting the compensation measures 
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with the investment distortion measures generates negative coefficients in some cases (p-value ≤ 0.10). This 
feature is more pronounced for Executive_CompMV compared with Stock_CompMV. 
Measures for over- and underinvestment carry both positive and negative coefficients (p-value ≤ 0.10). 
Measures for High (Low)_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets, Z-score, and Q are typically positive when 
significant (p-value ≤ 0.05), although the coefficients for Dividend per Share are consistently negative when 
significant (p-value ≤ 0.10). Z-score carries mixed coefficient signs for LnCG_Index and Stock_CompMV (p-
value ≤ 0.10). Thus, the support for H3A and H3B seems to be mixed. The IND_Avg_LEV coefficients are always 
negative, when significant (p-value ≤ 0.10). The evidence for hedging substitutes is generally weak.  
5.2. IR derivatives usage 
The IV–probit estimates for IR derivatives usage are shown in Table 6. All our monitoring and managerial 
compensation variables are significant and positively related to IR derivatives usage (p-value ≤ 0.01). This 
result is in line with earlier results for currency derivatives under the IV–probit estimations. These results 
provide support for H1 and H2. When the interaction terms have significant coefficients, they are always 
negatively related to IR derivatives usage (p-value ≤ 0.10). Thus, similar to earlier results, firms that have high 
or low investment opportunity measures reduce IR derivatives usage in relation to monitoring and managerial 
compensation. The IND_Avg_LEV coefficients are positive and significant (p-value ≤ 0.01), but mostly in our 
baseline models. This finding supports H3A. In the context of our results, not only is the relation between IR 
derivatives usage and leverage positive, but firms with High_Q and Low_Q also increase IR derivatives usage 
(p-value ≤ 0.10). These positive coefficients suggest that decisions about investment plans are linked with IR 
derivatives usage to affect leverage, giving rise to a positive effect. These results do not always hold across 
other related measures. The coefficients for High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets are consistently positive and 
significant (p-value ≤ 0.10), in support of H3B. There is mixed support for H4. 
[Table 5, about here] 
5.3. Combined derivatives users and non-users 
The results for combined derivative usage are not shown to save space, but these results are available on request. 
The monitoring and managerial compensation variables are positively related to combined derivatives usage, 
in line with previous results (p-value ≤ 0.01). The coefficients are generally larger compared with those of 
currency and IR derivatives usage. This may reflect potential contamination of the combined samples relative 
to the clean samples. The negative and monotonic effect of investment distortion costs on usage is maintained. 
In general, inferences based on combined derivatives usage are generally consistent with those for the clean 
samples for the IV–probit regressions.  
6. Conclusion  
This paper examines the relation between derivatives usage and monitoring mechanisms, managerial 
incentives, and investment distortion costs. We also consider the role of hedging substitutes in relation to 
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derivatives usage since hedging substitutes provide an alternative mechanism for firms to hedge. Our main 
focus is on separate samples of currency and IR derivatives users and non-users. Using two-stage logistic 
regressions, we find contrasting results for the relation between derivatives usage and our monitoring 
mechanisms, as well as managerial compensation. Board size and stock compensation are positively related to 
currency derivatives usage. NEDs and executive compensation are negatively related to currency derivatives 
usage. In contrast, board size and NEDs are negatively related to IR derivatives usage. However, LnCG_Index 
is positively related to IR derivatives usage. We believe that some of the observed negative coefficients may 
reflect the inability of the IV–GMM to generate reliable predictors for our two-stage logistic regressions. We 
take this view, since the IV–probit regressions generate coefficients with the expected positive sign for these 
measures. In most cases, there is a negative and monotonic relation between derivatives usage and our 
measures of investment distortion costs. This finding holds across estimation methods. Firms tend to reduce 
derivatives use irrespective of the riskiness of firms. Our sample covers a period of low IR volatility, whereas 
currency rates have been relatively volatile. The low IRs over the period of our study may explain the negative 
relation between IR derivatives usage and our interaction terms. The same cannot be said for currency 
derivatives usage. So, alternative explanations need to be considered.  
The negative relation between derivatives usage and some of our measures might indicate sub-optimal 
behaviour on the part of firms. While managerial risk aversion may cause firms to use derivatives (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985), some firms may under-hedge, over-hedge or even not hedge, depending on how their wealth is 
tied to firm value. Gay et al. (2003) and Huang et al. (2007) argue that firms are likely to over-hedge when 
they face increases in quantity (output) and market price risks. They suggest that firms should use more non-
linear derivatives, e.g., financial options, to resolve the over-hedging problem. Since the negative relation 
between derivatives usage and our interaction variables relate to investment decisions, a further explanation 
deserves consideration. As such, we suggest that managers reduce derivatives usage in situations where they 
are likely to benefit more than shareholders (see Froot et al., 1993; Tufano, 1998). In this case, the relation 
between derivatives usage and our measures will be negative. Future research should be extended to 
incorporate external governance measures to compare the relative influence of internal and external monitoring 
in investment and hedging decisions. Also, alternative specifications for Eq. (2) might be explored to see if 
better predicted values can be obtained for the two-stage logistic regression. This is in line with the view that 
the logistic regression provides a better fit to the data compared with the probit regression.  
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Variables Definitions and descriptions 
Panel A: Dependent variables for the first-stage regression 
LnCG_Index The natural logarithm of one plus the corporate governance index based on 14 governance components using a 
zero/one dummy for CEO-chair separation, presence/ absence of an audit committee, and so on (see Appendix 
II).  
LnBoard_Size The natural logarithm of the total number of directors on the board of each firm. 
NED The percentage of non-executive directors to the total number of directors. 
Stock_CompMV The total stock-based compensation (excluding stock options) divided by market value in each year, multiplied 
by 100. 
Executive_CompMV The total senior executive compensation awarded to top management for a given fiscal year divided by market 
value for the year, multiplied by 100. This includes all stock based compensations plus the usual cash payments, 
such as salaries and bonuses and other fringe benefits. 
Panel B: Industry-based instrumental variables year by year 
Industry average leverage 
(IND_Avg_LEV) 
The average of total debts divided by total assets for the industry. 
Industry average interest cover 
(IND_Avg_Interest_Cover) 
The average interest coverage ratio for the industry. 
Industry average earnings 
before interest and tax divided 
by market value 
(IND_Avg_EBIT_Market 
Value) 
The average earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) for the industry divided by the average market 
capitalization value for the industry. 
Industry average Z-score 
(IND_Avg_Z-score) 
The average Altman Z-score for the industry. 
Industry average free cash flow 
(IND_Avg_Free-Cash-
Flow_Total Assets) 
The average free cash flow for the industry divided by average total assets for the industry. 
Industry average R&D to Total 
Assets (IND_Avg_R&D_Total 
Assets) 
The average R&D for the industry divided by the average total assets for the industry.  
Industry average Q 
(IND_Avg_Q) 
The average Tobin’s Q for the industry. 
Industry average of dividend 
per share (IND_Avg_Dividend 
per Share) 
The average dividends for the industry divided by the average number of shares outstanding for the industry.  
Industry average log of market 
capitalisation measured as debt 
plus equity (LnMarket Value) 
The natural logarithm of the total market value of firms for the industry.  
Industry average log of total 
assets (LnTotal Assets) 
The natural logarithm of the total assets of the firms for the industry. 
Industry average log of total 
sales (LnSales) 
The natural logarithm of the total sales of the firms for the industry. 
Panel A shows the endogenous dependent variables used for the IV–GMM estimations (see Eqs. (1) and (2)). The associated 
explanatory variables, used to generate the full IV–GMM estimates for Eq. (1), are shown in Appendix III. The results for Eq. (1) 
are reported in Table 2 (see Section 4.2). Panel B shows the IVs used in the IV–GMM estimations. The averages of the IVs are 
constructed across five broad industry sectors, year by year. For all IV–GMM estimations, the chosen IVs are those that provide 
support for good model specifications in terms of no endogeneity, no over-riding restrictions, and no weak instruments. Typically, 
five to seven IVs are needed for each estimation. 
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Appendix II: Descriptions of components used to generate the corporate governance (CG) index 
Descriptions of zero/one variables DataStream code 
1. CEO-chair separation and whether Chair was previously CEO. CGBSO09V 
2. Whether shareholders have the right to vote on Executive Remuneration prior to adoption of stock based compensation 
plans. 
CGCPDP056 
3. Presence/absence of staggered board structure in firms. CGSRDP053 
4. Presence/absence of Audit Committee. ECSLDP005 
5. Presence/absence of Remuneration Committee. CGCPDP005 
6. Presence/absence of Nomination Committee. CGBSDP005 
7. Presence/absence of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Sustainability Committee. We include this committee since 
Bauer et al. (2015) show that there is a tendency for shareholders’ proposal belonging to CRS group to effect change.  
CGVSDP005 
8. Presence/absence of appropriate internal structure and information tools to improve effectiveness of Board Functions.  CGBFDP010 
9. Presence/absence of policy to maintain effective and independent Audit Committee. CGBFDP0011 
10. Presence/absence of policy to maintain effective and independent CSR Committee. CGBFDP0014 
11. Presence/absence of policy to maintain effective and independent Compensation Committee. CGBFDP0013 
12. Presence/absence of policy to maintain all-purpose policy on effectiveness and independence Board Committee.  CGBFDP0017 
13. Presence/absence of policy to maintain effective and independent Nomination Committee.  CGBFDP0012 
14. Presence/absence of Corporate Governance Committee.  CGBFDP005 
This appendix indicates the zero/one dummy variables used to construct the CG_Index. All the dummy variables are taken from 
DataStream to construct the CG index across firms, year by year. 
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Appendix III: Descriptions of explanatory variables used in estimations 
Variables Definitions Exp. signs  
Monitoring mechanisms 
LnCG_IndexP The predicted values of corporate governance index based on 14 zero/one governance 
components, for measures such as CEO-chair separation, presence/ absence of an audit 
committee, and so on (see Appendix II).  
+ 
LnBoard_SizeP Predicted values for the number of directors on the board. + 
NEDP Predicted values for the percentage of non-executive directors divided by the total number of 
directors in the board. 
+ 
Managerial incentives 
Stock_CompMVP The predicted values for total stock-based compensation (excluding stock options) divided by 
the market value. 
+ 
Executive_CompMVP Predicted values for total senior executive compensations divided by market value. + 
Stock Price_Volatility A stock’s average annual price movement (high and low) from its average price for each year.  + 
Underinvestment and financial distress 
Leverage Total debts divided by total assets.  + 
IND_Avg_LEV Average leverage measure for the industry.  + 
Interest_Cover Interest coverage ratio: earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by interest rate 
expense. 
– 
Debt_Maturity Average debt to maturity of a firm using the Eisdorfer (2008) model. That is, Debt_Maturity = 
(0.5 × book value of short-term debts + 5 × book value of long-term debts) / total debts. 
+ 
LT Debts_Total Debts Long-term debts divided by total debts. + 
EBIT_Market Value EBIT divided by market capitalization value. – 
Z-score The Altman Z-score model for predicting bankruptcies is: Z-score = 1.2 × (working capital / 
Total assets) + 1.4 × (Retained earnings / Total assets) + 3.3 × (EBIT/Total Assets) + 0.6 × 
(Market value of equity/Total liabilities) + 0.999 × (Sales/Total assets). 
+ 
Low_Q A dummy variable set to one if the Q falls in the bottom third of each sample of Q observations 
for currency, IR, combined users, and non-users; zero otherwise. Low Q firms are those with 
low profitable investment opportunities. 
+ 
Low_Z-score A dummy variable set to one if the Z-score for a firm falls in the bottom third of each sample 
of Z-score observations for currency, IR, combined users, and non-users; zero otherwise. 
+ 
Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total 
Assets 
A dummy variable set to one if the free cash flow to total assets for a firm falls in the bottom 
third of each sample of free cash flow to total assets observations for currency, IR, combined 
users, and non-users; zero otherwise.  
+ 
Overinvestment  
Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets The free cash flow is measured as the sum of operating income before depreciation less interest 
expense, less corporation income tax, less capital expenditures divided by the book values of 
total assets (see Harford et al., 2012). 
– 
High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total 
Assets 
A dummy variable set to one if the free cash flow to total assets for a firm falls in the top third 
of each sample of free cash flow to total assets observations, for currency, IR and non-users; 
zero otherwise.  
– 
CAP_Exped_PPE Capital expenditures divided by the sum of property, plant, and equipment. – 
CAP_Exped_Total Sales Capital expenditure divided by total sales. – 
High_Q A dummy variable set to one if the Q for a firm falls in the top third of each sample of Q 
observations for currency, IR, combined users and non-users; zero otherwise. High Q firms as 
designated as firms with high profitable investment opportunities. 
– 
High_Z-score A dummy variable set to one if the Z-score for a firm falls in the top third of each sample of Z-
score for currency, IR, combined users, and non-users; zero otherwise. 
– 
Growth and investment opportunities 
R&D_Total Assets Total R&D expenditures divided by total assets. + 
Q The Tobin’s Q, measured as market value divided by book value of assets. Market value is 
based on the total number of common shares outstanding multiplied by annual stock price. 
+ 
Dividend per Share Annual dividends paid divided by the total number of shares outstanding. + 
Hedging substitutes 
Convertible Debts_Total Debts  The total amount of convertible debts held divided by total debts. – 
Fixed Assets_Total Assets Fixed assets divided by total assets. – 
Current Ratio Current assets divided by current liabilities. – 
LnPre_Tax_Income The natural logarithm of the pre-tax income. + 
Cash_Total Assets Cash shown in balance sheet divided by total assets. – 
ROA The return on assets, defined as net income divided by to total assets. + 
Size 
LnMarket Value The natural logarithm of market value. + 
LnTotal Assets The natural logarithm of total assets. + 
Expected taxes 
TXR The total tax payments divided by pre-tax income. + 
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Table 1: Derivatives users by year and industry sector 
Firm-year All (combined) 
derivatives 
users 
Currency 
derivatives users & 
others 
Currency 
derivatives users 
only 
IR derivatives 
users & others 
IR 
derivatives 
users only 
Commodity 
derivatives users & 
others 
Commodity 
derivatives users only 
Non-
users 
All users and 
non-users 
Panel A: Firm-year observations by year 
2005 105 89 43 58 14 17 0 56 161 
2006 114 98 48 62 14 17 0 65 179 
2007 128 106 50 71 15 20 3 67 195 
2008 132 109 54 73 18 19 0 69 201 
2009 132 112 53 74 15 20 1 71 203 
2010 130 114 51 73 13 20 0 76 206 
2011 132 110 51 77 15 21 0 76 208 
2012 129 113 48 77 13 21 0 81 210 
2013 135 115 54 76 16 22 1 77 212 
2014 136 114 52 78 17 24 2 75 211 
2015 126 109 47 75 13 23 1 79 205 
Panel B: Firm-year observations by industry 
Oil & Gas 81 74 18 49 2 34 2 61 142 
Basic Materials 109 91 31 56 0 62 5 105 214 
Industrials 498 442 241 257 44 45 0 176 674 
Consumer Goods 179 152 56 112 16 43 0 77 256 
Health Care 89 81 46 43 8 0 0 126 215 
Consumer Services 292 219 78 207 72 29 1 102 394 
Telecommunications 22 22 11 11 0 0 0 31 53 
Utilities 13 11 0 13 2 11 0 7 20 
Technology 116 97 70 46 19 0 0 107 223 
Total 1,399 1,189 551 794 163 224 8 792 2,191 
This table indicates the number of currency, IR, and commodity derivatives users by year and industry sector. “Currency derivatives users & others” mainly are users of currency derivatives and 
occasional users of IR and/or commodity derivatives. A related definition applies for “IR derivatives users & others” and “Commodity derivatives users & others”. “Currency derivatives users 
only” are users of only currency derivatives. Related definitions apply to “IR derivatives users only” and “Commodity derivatives users only”. “Non-users” are firms that do not use any derivative 
instrument to hedge exposure. Details about derivatives usage are obtained from the financial reports of the sample of firms. Non-users typically declare in their financial reports that they have 
exposures to currency, IR, and/or commodity price risk, but do not hedge.  
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Table 2: Coefficient for all groups of derivatives users and non-users estimated using IV–GMM for firm-specific variables  
LnCG_Index LnBoard Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV 
 
LnCG_Index LnBoard Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
  Panel A: Currency derivatives users 
   
Panel B: IR derivatives users 
   
Leverage 0.044 0.175 –0.399c –0.008 –0.035 
 
–1.958 –1.094b 0.773 0.345 –0.278  
(1.109) (0.282) (0.223) (0.281) (0.286) 
 
(1.728) –0.491 –0.83 –1.013 –1.118 
Stock Price_Volatility 4.489a 0.801b –0.423c 0.533b –1.070b 
 
–3.389a –0.215 0.096 1.768a –0.274  
(1.367) (0.343) (0.251) (0.255) (0.500) 
 
(0.876) –0.264 –0.227 –0.622 –0.501 
Interest_Cover 0.001 0.002c 0.001 –0.003a –0.001 
 
–0.001b 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-score –0.332a 0.033 –0.074a 0.057a 0.079b 
 
–0.026b –0.006 –0.002 0.011 0.013c  
(0.109) (0.037) (0.016) (0.019) (0.036) 
 
(0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.008) 
Debt_Maturity –0.016 0.009 0.004 –0.047a –0.021 
 
–0.062 –0.002 –0.004 –0.015 –0.027  
(0.042) (0.014) (0.01) (0.018) (0.022) 
 
(0.049) (0.013) (0.018) (0.026) (0.022) 
Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –2.998b 2.367a 0.169 0.795c 4.185a 
 
–0.140 –0.765a 0.027 0.137 0.422  
(1.271) (0.826) (0.533) (0.444) (0.712) 
 
(0.759) (0.265) (0.197) (0.450) (0.672) 
EBIT_Market Value 2.368c –1.676a 0.649c –2.651a –1.409a 
 
–0.753 –1.212b 0.672 1.885c –1.203  
(1.373) (0.451) (0.343) (0.422) (0.547) 
 
(1.449) (0.496) (0.573) (1.111) (1.373) 
CAP_Exped_PPE 0.285 0.474b –0.108 –0.297 –0.063 
 
1.201a 0.336a –0.071 0.230 0.140  
(0.326) (0.228) (0.146) (0.195) (0.234) 
 
(0.252) (0.081) (0.056) (0.151) (0.207) 
Cap_Exped_Total Sales –1.893c –0.869 0.392 –0.285 –1.612c 
 
–1.561 0.336 0.932c 0.171 0.942  
(1.060) (0.967) (0.687) (1.255) (0.946) 
 
(1.498) (0.389) (0.530) (1.196) (0.856) 
R&D_Total Assets 0.061 –0.242a 0.100c 0.242b 0.455a 
 
0.386b 0.102c –0.040 –0.088 0.159  
(0.353) (0.093) (0.056) (0.116) (0.102) 
 
(0.153) (0.053) (0.064) (0.131) (0.136) 
Q 0.012 0.003 0.005c 0.016c –0.002 
 
–0.010 0.013a –0.009c –0.001 0.025a  
(0.023) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.009) 
 
(0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.009) 
Current Ratio 0.300b –0.024 0.096a –0.056 –0.219a 
 
0.206 0.097b –0.031 0.003 –0.011  
(0.138) (0.056) (0.035) (0.052) (0.072) 
 
(0.129) (0.044) (0.043) (0.070) (0.065) 
LnPre-Tax_Income 0.317c –0.082 0.071c 0.108a –0.233a 
 
0.090 0.069c 0.040 0.177c 0.281a  
(0.170) (0.058) (0.041) (0.039) (0.069) 
 
(0.126) (0.042) (0.036) (0.093) (0.090) 
ROA –2.318 0.571 –0.843c 0.585 –0.296 
 
–0.322 –1.535a 0.146 –0.644 –2.171a  
(2.500) (0.691) (0.438) (0.547) (0.881) 
 
(1.094) (0.405) (0.300) (0.762) (0.605) 
Dividend per Share –0.980b 0.884a –0.422a 0.043 1.324a 
 
–1.473a –0.389a 0.383a 0.518c –0.471b  
(0.483) (0.187) (0.157) (0.280) (0.229) 
 
(0.454) (0.138) (0.131) (0.290) (0.220) 
LnMarket Value 0.968a –0.033 0.030 –0.392a –0.403a 
 
0.489a 0.058c –0.033 –0.102 –0.553a  
(0.186) (0.096) (0.054) (0.077) (0.093) 
 
(0.097) (0.034) (0.031) (0.091) (0.087) 
LnTotal Assets –0.477b 0.193a –0.103c 0.491a 0.378a 
 
0.013 –0.001 0.004 –0.005 –0.033b  
(0.241) (0.071) (0.056) (0.095) (0.098) 
 
(0.028) (0.007) (0.006) (0.016) (0.014) 
LnSales –0.075 –0.102 0.097c –0.074c –0.074 
 
0.104 0.053b –0.024 –0.036 0.106b  
(0.161) (0.063) (0.050) (0.042) (0.060) 
 
(0.093) (0.026) (0.025) (0.065) (0.047) 
TXR 0.217 0.120 0.149c –0.057 –0.068 
 
–0.612b –0.216b 0.070 0.424b –0.130  
(0.289) (0.133) (0.088) (0.120) (0.121) 
 
(0.302) (0.104) (0.095) (0.193) (0.168) 
Constant –3.350a 1.563a 0.114 –0.375 2.460a 
 
–1.140c 1.191a 0.539b –0.336 2.357a  
(0.614) (0.426) (0.419) (0.388) (0.561) 
 
(0.583) (0.206) (0.213) (0.438) (0.497) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Continued 
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Table 2 (Continued)  
LnCG_Index LnBoard Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV 
 
LnCG_Index LnBoard Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  
Panel A: Currency derivatives users 
   
Panel B: IR derivatives users 
   
Diagnostic tests 
           
Number of obs. 122 69 69 64 66 
 
257 139 135 131 132 
Wald χ2 7,283.91a 1,128.96a 696.51a 989.96a 11,564.32a 
 
1,130.10a 292.78a 330.38a 176.96a 310.28a 
Root MSE 0.486 0.127 0.074 0.106 0.122 
 
0.599 0.13 0.089 0.303 0.268 
Hansen J χ2 1.669 11.78 10.279 10.312 6.197 
 
3.630 7.542 2.312 7.754 11.700 
GMM C statistic χ2 0.300 0.181 0.046 2.348 0.384 
 
0.171 1.961 0.487 0.219 0.162 
First stage Adj. R2 0.721 0.875 0.857 0.894 0.836 
 
0.510 0.683 0.644 0.707 0.684 
First stage partial R2 0.098 0.291 0.294 0.370 0.331 
 
0.092 0.203 0.055 0.228 0.216 
F-statistic for weak instrument 2.107c 1.988c 1.922c 2.089c 2.897b 
 
2.438c 3.424a 2.183c 3.456a 3.624a  
Panel C: Combined currency and IR derivatives users 
  
Panel D: Non-users  
   
Leverage 0.872 0.153 –0.001 –0.522 –0.080 
 
1.721 –0.285 0.094 –0.671 0.449  
(2.301) (0.460) (0.409) (0.884) (0.641) 
 
(2.007) (0.566) (0.271) (0.514) (0.636) 
Stock Price_Volatility –0.907b 0.326b –0.014 –0.097 –0.074 
 
–0.042 –1.411b 0.656b 1.455b –0.099  
(0.423) (0.136) (0.094) (0.182) (0.209) 
 
(0.801) (0.687) (0.262) (0.669) (0.818) 
Interest_Cover 0.001 0.001 0.001 –0.001a 0.001 
 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-score 0.020 0.008 0.013c 0.014 0.001 
 
0.051 –0.048a 0.004 –0.007 0.016  
(0.032) (0.010) (0.008) (0.019) (0.017) 
 
(0.035) '(0.017) (0.012) (0.031) (0.026) 
Debt_Maturity –0.025 0.019 0.007 –0.052c –0.020 
 
0.031 0.008 0.005 0.062a 0.074a  
(0.056) (0.016) (0.012) (0.028) (0.024) 
 
(0.039) (0.018) (0.009) (0.023) (0.026) 
Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 0.987 0.008 0.227 –0.128 –0.811 
 
–0.557 0.584 –0.271 1.130 0.729  
(0.869) (0.350) (0.202) (0.616) (1.067) 
 
(0.636) (0.650) (0.406) (0.808) (0.911) 
EBIT_Market Value 2.101a –0.125 –0.362a –0.934a –0.821a 
 
–1.881a 0.226 –1.028a –0.874c 0.288  
(0.427) (0.175) (0.121) (0.273) (0.211) 
 
(0.493) (0.462) (0.211) (0.523) (0.538) 
CAP_Exped_PPE –0.301 0.320a 0.001 –0.058 –0.093 
 
–0.025 0.068 0.045 –0.112 –0.153c  
(0.499) (0.114) (0.088) (0.215) (0.164) 
 
(0.039) '(0.071) (0.052) (0.109) (0.093) 
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Table 2 (Continued)  
LnCG_Index LnBoard Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV 
 
LnCG_Index LnBoard Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV  
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. 
 
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.  
Panel C: Combined currency and IR derivatives users 
  
Panel D: Non-users  
   
Cap_Exped_Total Sales 0.538 –0.269 –0.005 0.099 –0.098 
 
–0.318 –1.054 0.338 3.836b –2.065  
(0.806) (0.174) (0.123) (0.328) (0.339) 
 
(0.363) (1.001) (0.587) (1.673) (1.518) 
R&D_Total Assets 0.225 –0.119 0.017 0.115 0.023 
 
0.107 –0.057 0.025 –0.212b 0.011  
(0.335) (0.079) (0.076) (0.165) (0.159) 
 
(0.086) (0.062) (0.035) (0.092) (0.098) 
Q –0.015 0.001 0.005 0.013c 0.017 
 
–0.001 0.001 –0.001 –0.027a –0.012  
–0.03 (0.005) (0.004) (0.008) (0.014) 
 
(0.023) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) 
Current Ratio 0.107 –0.031 –0.046a –0.030 0.038 
 
0.007 –0.061a 0.039a –0.095a –0.065b  
(0.079) (0.027) (0.017) (0.040) (0.048) 
 
(0.046) (0.019) (0.011) (0.024) (0.033) 
LnPre-Tax_Income –0.131 –0.012 0.038 0.010 0.139a 
 
0.152c 0.009 0.059b 0.046 0.274a  
(0.099) (0.032) (0.025) (0.085) (0.051) 
 
(0.085) (0.045) (0.030) (0.076) (0.102) 
ROA 0.102 0.203 0.084 2.500b 0.950c 
 
0.001 –0.820b 0.752b 1.279c 0.674  
(1.268) (0.402) (0.295) (1.244) (0.560) 
 
(0.791) (0.355) (0.300) (0.726) (0.580) 
Dividend per Share –0.439b 0.119c 0.008 0.121 0.227a 
 
–0.050 –0.154 0.204c –0.101 –0.060  
(0.174) (0.066) (0.043) (0.099) (0.082) 
 
(0.268) (0.133) (0.108) (0.192) (0.254) 
LnMarket Value 0.457a 0.069b –0.005 –0.349a –0.451a 
 
0.125 0.175a –0.072b –0.120 –0.57a  
(0.102) (0.032) (0.019) (0.060) (0.076) 
 
(0.102) (0.045) (0.031) (0.084) (0.102) 
LnTotal Assets 0.140 0.074 0.076b 0.362a 0.054 
 
0.209 –0.144b 0.051 0.013 0.334b  
(0.133) (0.046) (0.033) (0.117) (0.059) 
 
(0.142) (0.073) (0.043) (0.142) (0.153) 
LnSales –0.032 –0.027 –0.071a –0.041 0.065 
 
0.280a 0.055 –0.087a –0.096 –0.252b  
(0.099) (0.033) (0.022) (0.058) (0.045) 
 
(0.089) (0.077) (0.032) (0.081) (0.108) 
TXR –0.140 0.051 0.048 0.155 –0.029 
 
–0.759a –0.285b 0.369a 0.139 0.163  
(0.164) (0.070) (0.045) (0.175) (0.108) 
 
(0.175) (0.146) (0.101) (0.247) (0.386) 
Constant –2.207a 1.179a 0.056 0.558 2.249a 
 
–2.713a 2.117a 0.285 1.243 2.196a  
(0.403) (0.136) (0.122) (0.345) (0.248) 
 
(0.487) (0.467) (0.291) (0.811) (0.777) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diagnostic tests 
           
Number of observations 418 297 288 281 287 
 
248 84 80 77 83 
Wald χ2 1,443.03a 693.45a 288.80a 154.45a 381.72a 
 
1,142.23a 772.71a 664.37a 685.84a 6,002.20a 
Root MSE 0.638 0.165 0.12 0.246 0.248 
 
0.557 0.12 0.082 0.205 0.293 
Hansen J statistic (χ2) 0.109 0.122 2.332 1.909 2.444 
 
5.989 6.808 7.066 11.556 11.413 
Hayashi C statistic (χ2) 0.088 0.254 0.06 0.044 0.08 
 
0.599 2.384 0.017 1.609 0.712 
First-stage Adj. R2 0.422 0.451 0.446 0.435 0.451 
 
0.498 0.735 0.725 0.756 0.745 
First-stage partial R2 0.013 0.026 0.030 0.026 0.023 
 
0.036 0.222 0.186 0.242 0.277 
F-statistic for weak instrument 3.310b 4.095b 4.689a 3.599b 3.649b 
 
1.982c 2.044c 2.390c 1.844c 2.539c 
Variable definitions are in Appendices I and III. The general method of moments (GMM) method is estimated together with the instrumental variables (IVs) chosen from the set shown in Panel B of 
Appendix I. Not all the IVs are used in the estimation. The chosen IVs are those that ensure adequate model specifications in terms of over-riding restrictions, endogeneity, and no weak instruments. 
The Hansen J statistic is a test of over-riding restrictions. The Hayashi C statistic is a test for endogeneity. The partial R2 measures the correlation between Leverage and the IVs, after partialing out 
other variables. The F-statistic is a test for weak instruments. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5-, and 10% level, respectively. The IV–GMM is estimated using robust standard errors. 
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Table 3: Coefficient estimates of the logistic regressions for currency derivatives usage based on a two-stage estimation procedure       
 LnCG_IndexP LnBoard_SizeP NEDP Stock_CompMVP Executive_CompMVP  
 Model 1A Model 1B  Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B  
Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME 
Monitoring mechanisms 
                    
LnCG_IndexP –0.478 –0.081 0.494 0.069 
                
 
(0.333) 
 
(0.553) 
                 
LnCG_IndexP×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –0.227 –0.032 
                
   
(0.519) 
                 
LnCG_IndexP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 0.033 0.005 
                
   
(1.064) 
                 
LnCG_IndexP×High_Q 
  
–0.166 –0.023 
                
   
(0.645) 
                 
LnCG_IndexP×Low_Q 
  
0.111 0.015 
                
   
(0.421) 
                 
LnCG_IndexP×High_Z-score 
  
0.280 0.039 
                
   
(0.766) 
                 
LnCG_IndexP×Low_Z-score 
  
–1.530a –0.214a 
                
   
(0.477) 
                 
LnBoard_SizeP  
    
3.225a 0.539a 1.474 0.184 
            
     
(1.038) 
 
(2.328) 
             
LnBoard_SizeP×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
   
–0.666 –0.083 
            
       
(3.256) 
             
LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
   
1.561 1.950 
            
       
(1.087) 
             
LnBoard_SizeP×High_Q 
      
5.034 0.629 
            
       
(3.240) 
             
LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Q 
      
–1.556a –1.943a 
            
       
(0.369) 
             
LnBoard_SizeP×High_Z-score 
      
–1.307a –1.632a 
            
       
(0.405) 
             
LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Z-score 
      
1.748a 2.183a 
            
       
(0.370) 
             
NEDP 
        
–0.339a –0.053a –0.229b –0.030b 
        
         
(0.065) 
 
(0.094) 
         
NEDP×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
        
0.021 0.003 
        
           
(0.069) 
         
NEDP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
        
–0.079 –0.010 
        
           
(0.095) 
         
NEDP×High_Q 
          
–0.164c –0.022c 
        
           
(0.094) 
         
NEDP×Low_Q 
          
–0.055 –0.007 
        
           
(0.074) 
         
NEDP×High_Z-score 
          
–0.151 –0.020 
        
           
(0.098) 
         
NEDP×Low_Z-score 
          
–0.080 –0.011 
        
           
(0.071) 
         
Continued 
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Table 3 (Continued)     
 LnCG_IndexP LnBoard_SizeP NEDP Stock_CompMVP Executive_CompMVP  
 Model 1A Model 1B  Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B  
Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME 
Managerial Incentives 
                    
Stock_CompMVP 
            
0.965 0.166 3.089b 0.424b 
    
             
(0.725) 
 
(1.388) 
     
Stock_CompMVP×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
           
3.433 0.472 
    
               
(2.483) 
     
Stock_CompMVP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
           
–8.625b –1.185b 
    
               
(3.912) 
     
Stock_CompMVP×High_Q 
              
–1.442 –0.198 
    
               
(2.265) 
     
Stock_CompMVP×Low_Q 
              
1.798 0.247 
    
               
(1.352) 
     
Stock_CompMVP×High_Z-score 
              
–4.014 –0.551 
    
               
(4.446) 
     
Stock_CompMVP×Low_Z-score 
              
–4.288a –0.589a 
    
               
(1.497) 
     
Executive_CompMVP 
                
–7.453a –1.030a –4.035c –0.436c 
                 
(0.813) 
 
(2.211) 
 
Executive_CompMVP×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
               
–0.772 –0.083 
                   
(2.396) 
 
Executive_CompMVP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
               
–8.243 –0.890 
                   
(6.605) 
 
Executive_CompMVP×High_Q 
                  
–1.006a –1.086a 
                   
(3.774) 
 
Executive_CompMVP×Low_Q 
                  
3.891 0.420 
                   
(3.196) 
 
Executive_CompMVP×High_Z-score 
                 
5.099c 0.550c 
                   
(3.078) 
 
Executive_CompMVP×Low_Z-score 
                 
–6.956b –0.751b 
                   
(3.556) 
 
Stock Price_Volatility –2.645 –0.450 –1.831 –0.256 –2.661 –0.445 –4.645b –0.580b –0.597 –0.093 –2.078 –0.274 –2.675 –0.461 –2.991 –0.411 –1.052 –0.145 –1.351 –0.146 
 
(1.762) 
 
(1.911) 
 
(1.738) 
 
(2.012) 
 
(1.902) 
 
(2.215) 
 
(1.660) 
 
(2.110) 
 
(1.733) 
 
(2.320) 
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Table 3 (Continued)     
 LnCG_IndexP LnBoard_SizeP NEDP Stock_CompMVP Executive_CompMVP  
 Model 1A Model 1B  Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B  
Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME 
Underinvestment and financial distress 
                  
IND_Avg_LEV  –6.685b –1.138b –1.056a –1.478a –6.631b –1.109b –9.815b –1.226b –6.832b –1.070b –4.516 –0.594 –4.618 –0.796 –9.879a –1.357a –6.303 –0.871c –9.391c –1.014c 
 
(3.110) 
 
(0.359) 
 
(3.174) 
 
(4.076) 
 
(3.251) 
 
(3.623) 
 
(2.983) 
 
(3.647) 
 
(3.847) 
 
(5.168) 
 
Interest_Cover 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 –0.001 0.001 0.001 –0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
Z-score 0.062 0.011 0.032 0.004 0.080c 0.013c 0.004 0.001 0.067 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.039 0.007 0.019 0.003 0.107c 0.015c 0.091 0.010 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.059) 
 
(0.061) 
 
Debt_Maturity 0.027 0.005 0.066 0.009 –0.007 –0.001 –0.016 –0.002 0.142c 0.022c 0.154 0.020c 0.066 0.011 0.134 0.018 0.077 0.011 0.069 0.007 
 
(0.071) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.073) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.098) 
 
Low_Q 
  
0.890 0.124 
  
3.471a 4.334a 
  
2.678 0.352 
  
0.572 0.079 
  
0.014 0.002 
   
(0.561) 
   
(0.796) 
   
(2.229) 
   
(0.545) 
   
(1.356) 
 
EBIT_Market Value –7.766a –1.322a –7.971a –1.115a –7.578a –1.268a –6.827a –0.853a –7.909a –1.238a –7.426a –0.977a –7.560a –1.302a –8.737a –1.200a –6.063a –0.838a –7.023a –0.758a 
 
(2.017) 
 
(2.066) 
 
(2.016) 
 
(1.823) 
 
(1.846) 
 
(1.797) 
 
(1.968) 
 
(2.291) 
 
(1.939) 
 
(2.104) 
 
CAP_Exped_Total Sales –6.300a –1.073a –8.238a –1.153a –5.821a –0.974a –9.460a –1.181a –0.883 –0.138 –2.963 –0.390 –7.588a –1.307a –1.066a –1.464a –3.587c –0.496c –7.404a –0.799a 
 
(1.861) 
 
(2.431) 
 
(1.888) 
 
(2.743) 
 
(1.654) 
 
(1.922) 
 
(1.991) 
 
(3.212) 
 
(2.053) 
 
(2.589) 
 
Dividend per Share –4.170a –0.710a –4.040a –0.565a –3.649a –0.610a –1.832 –0.229 –3.728a –0.584a –3.662a –0.482a –3.631a –0.625a –3.413a –0.469a –5.355a –0.740a –3.922a –0.423a 
 
(1.421) 
 
(1.052) 
 
(1.330) 
 
(1.355) 
 
(1.421) 
 
(1.238) 
 
(1.369) 
 
(1.174) 
 
(1.208) 
 
(1.235) 
 
Low_Z-score 
  
1.565a 0.219a 
  
–3.788a –4.731a 
  
2.116 0.279 
  
1.107c 0.152c 
  
2.422 0.261 
   
(0.598) 
   
(0.799) 
   
(2.218) 
   
(0.576) 
   
(1.593) 
 
Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
 
2.884c 0.404c 
  
–2.894 –3.614 
  
6.474b 0.852b 
  
7.429a 1.020a 
  
7.795b 0.841b 
   
(1.499) 
   
(2.257) 
   
(3.175) 
   
(2.197) 
   
(3.677) 
 
Overinvestment 
                    
Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –5.016b –0.854b 6.091 0.852 –4.878b –0.816b 6.634 0.829 –6.455b –1.011a 6.235c 0.821c –5.438b –0.937a 7.287b 1.001b –5.616c –0.776c 4.459 0.481 
 
(2.261) 
 
(4.077) 
 
(2.303) 
 
(4.781) 
 
(2.611) 
 
(3.769) 
 
(2.162) 
 
(3.715) 
 
(3.023) 
 
(4.610) 
 
High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
 
–1.552b –0.217b 
  
–0.406 –0.051 
  
–2.539 –0.334 
  
–2.798a –0.384a 
  
–1.555 –0.168 
   
(0.713) 
   
(6.839) 
   
(2.150) 
   
(0.803) 
   
(0.964) 
 
CAP_Exped_PPE –0.501 –0.085 –0.567 –0.079 –0.467 –0.078 –0.394 –0.049 –1.009c –0.158c –0.660 –0.087 –0.400 –0.069 –0.274 –0.038 –1.075c –0.149c –1.174b –0.127b 
 
(0.395) 
 
(0.419) 
 
(0.374) 
 
(0.364) 
 
(0.586) 
 
(0.555) 
 
(0.398) 
 
(0.334) 
 
(0.633) 
 
(0.572) 
 
High_Q 
  
–0.324 –0.045 
  
–1.129 –1.410c 
  
4.404 0.580 
  
–0.031 –0.004 
  
2.976c 0.321c 
   
(0.743) 
   
(0.689) 
   
(2.895) 
   
(0.868) 
   
(1.699) 
 
High_Z-score 
  
0.727 0.102 
  
2.843a 3.550a 
  
5.395c 0.710c 
  
2.046 0.281 
  
–1.329 –0.143 
   
(0.952) 
   
(0.857) 
   
(3.045) 
   
(1.509) 
   
(1.375) 
 
Growth and investment opportunities 
                  
R&D_Total Assets –1.489a –0.253a –1.791a –0.251a –1.501a –0.251a –1.296a –0.162a –1.368a –0.214a –1.444a –0.190a –1.237a –0.213a –1.748a –0.240a –1.415a –0.196a –1.704a –0.184a 
 
(0.364) 
 
(0.456) 
 
(0.362) 
 
(0.422) 
 
(0.330) 
 
(0.401) 
 
(0.347) 
 
(0.456) 
 
(0.340) 
 
(0.424) 
 
Q –0.041 –0.007 0.002 0.001 –0.047 –0.008 0.019 0.002 –0.012 –0.002 0.047 0.006 –0.033 –0.006 0.024 0.003 –0.010 –0.001 0.110 0.012 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.070) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.065) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.082) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.087) 
 
Hedging substitutes  
                    
Current Ratio –0.102 –0.017 –0.076 –0.011 –0.068 –0.011 –0.187 –0.023 –0.255 –0.040 –0.259 –0.034 –0.123 –0.021 –0.246 –0.034 –0.187 –0.026 –0.287 –0.031 
 
(0.154) 
 
(0.193) 
 
(0.154) 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.214) 
 
(0.148) 
 
(0.180) 
 
(0.159) 
 
(0.232) 
 
LnPre_Tax_Income 0.329 0.056 0.427 0.060 0.363 0.061 0.520 0.065 0.511c 0.080c 0.623b 0.082b 0.249 0.043 0.438 0.060 0.451 0.062 0.484 0.052 
 
(0.272) 
 
(0.316) 
 
(0.275) 
 
(0.345) 
 
(0.288) 
 
(0.316) 
 
(0.247) 
 
(0.322) 
 
(0.320) 
 
(0.329) 
 
ROA 1.867 0.318 1.764 0.247 1.890 0.316 1.853 0.231 2.016 0.316 0.865 0.114 3.146 0.542 1.053 0.145 3.184 0.440 4.365 0.471 
 
(2.814) 
 
(3.745) 
 
(2.858) 
 
(3.618) 
 
(3.010) 
 
(3.377) 
 
(2.644) 
 
(3.771) 
 
(3.661) 
 
(4.098) 
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Table 3 (Continued)     
 LnCG_IndexP LnBoard_SizeP NEDP Stock_CompMVP Executive_CompMVP  
 Model 1A Model 1B  Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B Model 4A Model 4B Model 5A Model 5B  
Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME Coeff.  ME 
Size 
                    
LnMarket Value 0.330 0.056 0.619b 0.087b 0.263 0.044 0.437 0.055 0.454c 0.071c 0.693a 0.091a 0.303 0.052 0.570b 0.078b 0.255 0.035 0.780a 0.084a 
 
(0.219) 
 
(0.259) 
 
(0.224) 
 
(0.313) 
 
(0.238) 
 
(0.252) 
 
(0.212) 
 
(0.267) 
 
(0.273) 
 
(0.297) 
 
LnTotal Assets 0.185b 0.032b 0.053 0.007 0.234b 0.039a 0.094 0.012 0.065 0.010 –0.050 –0.007 0.229b 0.039a 0.098 0.013 0.330a 0.046a 0.253b 0.027b 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.093) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.106) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.104) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.107) 
 
LnSales 0.103 0.018 –0.210 –0.029 –0.166 –0.028 –0.408c –0.051c 0.486b 0.076b 0.219 0.029 –0.082 –0.014 –0.513b –0.071b 0.048 0.007 –0.352 –0.038 
 
(0.213) 
 
(0.264) 
 
(0.204) 
 
(0.246) 
 
(0.220) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(0.193) 
 
(0.226) 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.239) 
 
TXR 0.168 0.029 –0.317 –0.044 0.258 0.043 0.279 0.035 0.268 0.042 0.052 0.007 0.413 0.071 –0.181 –0.025 0.864 0.119 0.807 0.087 
 
(0.621) 
 
(0.782) 
 
(0.659) 
 
(0.921) 
 
(0.606) 
 
(0.702) 
 
(0.552) 
 
(0.845) 
 
(0.733) 
 
(0.808) 
 
Constant –0.701 
 
–1.482 
 
–6.641 
 
–0.945 
 
5.551 
 
2.965 
 
–0.710 
 
–0.101 
 
1.092 
 
–0.877 
 
 
(1.201) 
 
(1.663) 
 
(2.342) 
 
(4.875) 
 
(1.677) 
 
(2.773) 
 
(1.127) 
 
(1.927) 
 
(1.442) 
 
(2.244) 
 
Industry effect YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Year effect YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Diagnostic tests 
                    
Number of observations 507 
 
507 
 
507 
 
507 
 
507 
 
507 
 
507 
 
507 
 
507 
 
507 
 
Wald χ2 129.35a 
 
140.17a 
 
131.63a 
 
168.41a 
 
126.90a 
 
179.63a 
 
125.16a 
 
153.54a 
 
156.88a 
 
172.71a 
 
Log pseudolikelihood –256.72  –217.89  –252.07  –196.47  –238.55  –206.34  –259.35  –214.74  –215.10  –171.89  
Pseudo R2 0.269 
 
0.380 
 
0.280 
 
0.441 
 
0.321 
 
0.413 
 
0.262 
 
0.389 
 
0.388 
 
0.511 
 
Pearson χ2 (goodness-of-fit) 474.28 
 
540.46 
 
461.82 
 
468.10 
 
506.00 
 
463.86 
 
482.20 
 
542.94 
 
440.15 
 
581.37 
 
Akakie information criteria 571.45 
 
551.78 
 
566.13 
 
468.97 
 
533.10 
 
486.68 
 
566.69 
 
507.47 
 
480.20 
 
419.78 
 
Correctly classified (%) 75.54 
 
80.28 
 
75.35 
 
83.43 
 
76.73 
 
80.08 
 
74.16 
 
80.47 
 
78.90 
 
85.60 
 
Variable definitions are in Appendices I and III. The superscript P indicates that the coefficient is based on the predicted values of the two-stage IV–GMM (see Eq. (2)). Models 1A, 
2A, 3A, etc. are the baseline models. Models 1B, 2B, 3B, etc. are the corresponding models with interaction terms. ME denotes the marginal effect. It represents the derivative of the 
approximate change in y for one unit change in x. Theoretically, ME should be between zero and one. ME may be outside the range of zero and one if the slope of the curve changes 
quickly. In this case, we retain the ME values that are outside the range of zero and one. Correctly classified denotes the performance of each logistic regression relative to a naive 
proportional chance model (see Joy and Tollefson, 1975). a, b, and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. The heteroscedastic-robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. Year and industry dummies are used in all estimations. Most of the year and industry effects are insignificant. We therefore apply the general-to-specific 
methodology commonly used in full-system estimation in econometrics, by sequentially removing the year and industry coefficients with the largest p-value first, as long as this 
procedure minimises the -2 log likelihood ratio (see Pagan, 1987, for a review of the general-to-specific methodology). This procedure is only applied to the year and industry coefficients 
that are insignificant. 
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Table 4: Coefficient estimates of the logistic regressions for IR derivatives usage based on a two-stage estimation procedure  
  
 
 LnCG_IndexP LnBoard_SizeP NEDP Stock_CompMVP Executive_CompMVP  
 Model 6A Model 6B  Model 7A Model 7B Model 8A Model 8B Model 9A Model 9B Model 10A Model 10B 
  Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME 
Monitoring mechanisms 
                    
LnCG_IndexP 1.349a 0.164a 3.471a 0.219a 
                
 
(0.524) 
 
(0.901) 
                 
LnCG_IndexP×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –0.606 –0.038 
                
   
(0.851) 
                 
LnCG_IndexP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –0.085 –0.005 
                
   
(1.536) 
                 
LnCG_IndexP×High_Q 
  
–0.361 –0.023 
                
   
(0.835) 
                 
LnCG_IndexP×Low_Q 
  
–1.833c –0.116c 
                
   
(1.100) 
                 
LnCG_IndexP×Low_Z-score 
  
–3.137b –0.198a 
                
   
(1.297) 
                 
LnBoard_SizeP  
    
–4.263c –0.529b 2.669 0.178 
            
     
(2.288) 
 
(4.493) 
             
LnBoard_SizeP×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
   
–2.163 –0.144 
            
       
(3.822) 
             
LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
   
1.511b 1.009b 
            
       
(0.758) 
             
LnBoard_SizeP×High_Q 
      
–0.735 –0.049 
            
       
(3.975) 
             
LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Q 
      
–2.241a –1.496a 
            
       
(0.682) 
             
LnBoard_SizeP×Low_Z-score 
      
–1.119b –0.747b 
            
       
(0.571) 
             
NEDP 
        
–0.239a –0.027a 0.166 0.011 
        
         
(0.049) 
 
(0.119) 
         
NEDP×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
        
–0.127 –0.008 
        
           
(0.103) 
         
NEDP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
        
–0.373 –0.024 
        
           
(0.242) 
         
NEDP×High_Q 
          
–0.152 –0.010 
        
           
(0.106) 
         
NEDP×Low_Q 
          
–0.367b –0.023b 
        
           
(0.168) 
         
NEDP×Low_Z-score 
          
–0.506a –0.032a 
        
           
(0.148) 
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Table 4 (Continued)  
  
 
 LnCG_IndexP LnBoard_SizeP NEDP Stock_CompMVP Executive_CompMVP  
 Model 6A Model 6B  Model 7A Model 7B Model 8A Model 8B Model 9A Model 9B Model 10A Model 10B  
Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME 
Managerial Incentives 
                    
Stock_CompMVP 
            
1.543a 1.802a 1.828a 1.264a 
    
             
(0.392) 
 
(0.545) 
     
Stock_CompMVP×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
           
4.131 0.286 
    
               
(4.993) 
     
Stock_CompMVP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
           
–1.375c –0.951c 
    
               
(0.740) 
     
Stock_CompMVP×High_Q 
              
–8.562b –0.592b 
    
               
(4.358) 
     
Stock_CompMVP×Low_Q 
              
–0.683 –0.047 
    
               
(8.309) 
     
Stock_CompMVP×Low_Z-score 
             
–1.605 –0.111 
    
               
(4.588) 
     
Executive_CompMVP 
                
2.015b 0.261b 5.018a 0.322a 
                 
(0.887) 
 
(1.750) 
 
Executive_CompMVP×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
               
–0.440 –0.028 
                   
(1.532) 
 
Executive_CompMVP×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
               
–5.764b –0.370b 
                   
(2.739) 
 
Executive_CompMVP×High_Q 
                  
–8.096a –0.520a 
                   
(2.378) 
 
Executive_CompMVP×Low_Q 
                  
7.411a 0.476a 
                   
(2.488) 
 
Executive_CompMVP×Low_Z-score 
                 
–8.098a –0.520a 
                   
(2.261) 
 
Stock Price_Volatility –4.989c –0.605c –1.479a –0.935a –4.364c –0.542c –1.544a –1.031a –2.745 –0.304 –6.089 –0.386 –8.246a –0.963a –1.556a –1.076a –1.029a –1.331a –1.686a –1.083a 
 
(2.920) 
 
(0.431) 
 
(2.488) 
 
(0.424) 
 
(2.831) 
 
(4.441) 
 
(2.846) 
 
(0.439) 
 
(0.273) 
 
(0.509) 
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Table 4 (Continued)  
  
 
 LnCG_IndexP LnBoard_SizeP NEDP Stock_CompMVP Executive_CompMVP  
 Model 6A Model 6B  Model 7A Model 7B Model 8A Model 8B Model 9A Model 9B Model 10A Model 10B  
Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME 
Underinvestment and financial distress 
                  
IND_Avg_LEV  –8.106 –0.982 –8.335 –0.527 –2.639 –0.328 5.319 0.355 –0.663 –0.734 –1.933 –0.123 9.989b 1.167b 6.356 0.439 8.112c 1.050c 1.181c 0.759c 
 
(9.390) 
 
(9.958) 
 
(6.558) 
 
(5.452) 
 
(1.016) 
 
(5.722) 
 
(4.117) 
 
(4.948) 
 
(4.255) 
 
(0.626) 
 
Interest_Cover –0.011c –0.001c –0.016 –0.001 –0.015c –0.002c –0.019 –0.001 –0.015 –0.002 –0.020 –0.001c –0.023b –0.003b –0.024c –0.002c –0.012 –0.002 –0.016 –0.001 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.011) 
 
Z-score –0.609a –0.074a –1.316a –0.083a –0.550a –0.068a –1.076a –0.072a –0.715a –0.079a –1.084a –0.069a –0.690a –0.081a –0.994a –0.069a –0.399a –0.052a –1.115a –0.072a 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.415) 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.325) 
 
(0.176) 
 
(0.321) 
 
(0.165) 
 
(0.291) 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.300) 
 
Debt_Maturity 0.203c 0.025c 0.286 0.018 0.197c 0.024c 0.325b 0.022b 0.272b 0.030b 0.464a 0.029a 0.359a 0.042a 0.329b 0.023b 0.309a 0.040a 0.365b 0.023b 
                                                                                                              (0.117)
 
(0.186) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.162) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.175) 
 
Low_Q 
  
–0.170 –0.011 
  
4.479a 2.991a 
  
8.859c 0.562c 
  
–0.456 –0.032 
  
–4.148a –0.266a 
   
(1.213) 
   
(1.393) 
   
(4.647) 
   
(2.514) 
   
(1.543) 
 
EBIT_Market Value –8.848a –1.072a –8.006c –0.506c –1.028a –1.277a –8.532c –0.570c –1.046a –1.158a –1.443a –0.915a –3.097 –0.362 –0.425 –0.029 –5.105b –0.661b –5.021 –0.323 
 
(3.391) 
 
(4.559) 
 
(0.337) 
 
(4.921) 
 
(0.354) 
 
(0.553) 
 
(2.340) 
 
(3.554) 
 
(2.223) 
 
(4.674) 
 
CAP_Exped_Total Sales –4.059a –0.492a –1.011a –0.639a –3.456a –0.429a –1.032b –0.689b 0.801 0.089 –1.367b –0.867b –1.548a –1.808a –2.355a –1.628a –4.406a –0.570a –1.459b –0.937a 
 
(1.278) 
 
(0.379) 
 
(1.225) 
 
(0.440) 
 
(1.456) 
 
(0.593) 
 
(0.473) 
 
(0.708) 
 
(1.544) 
 
(0.578) 
 
Dividend per Share –5.344a –0.648a –7.753a –0.490a –4.910a –0.610a –8.051a –0.538a –3.901a –0.432a –4.705b –0.298b –3.125a –0.365a –3.853a –0.266a –4.694a –0.607a –7.990a –0.513a 
 
(1.166) 
 
(2.870) 
 
(1.194) 
 
(2.037) 
 
(1.462) 
 
(2.025) 
 
(0.948) 
 
(1.260) 
 
(1.264) 
 
(2.400) 
 
Low_Z-score 
  
–3.976a –0.251a 
  
1.742 1.163 
  
8.584b 0.544b 
  
–4.419a –0.306a 
  
–1.379 –0.089 
   
(1.078) 
   
(1.130) 
   
(3.670) 
   
(1.409) 
   
(1.160) 
 
Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
 
7.513a 0.475a 
  
–2.253 –1.504 
  
2.214b 1.404a 
  
1.626a 1.124a 
  
1.500a 0.964a 
   
(2.683) 
   
(1.570) 
   
(0.924) 
   
(0.432) 
   
(0.404) 
 
Overinvestment 
                    
Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –4.490 –0.544 8.529 0.539 –5.103 –0.633c 7.587 0.507 –8.212b –0.910b –3.032 –0.192 –0.693 –0.081 7.053 0.488 –2.808 –0.363 –3.152 –0.202 
 
(3.005) 
 
(6.207) 
 
(3.113) 
 
(5.540) 
 
(3.950) 
 
(8.110) 
 
(4.580) 
 
(6.262) 
 
(3.301) 
 
(7.313) 
 
High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
 
–0.534 –0.034 
  
3.682 0.246 
  
3.136 0.199 
  
–1.669 –0.115 
  
–0.084 –0.005 
   
(1.048) 
   
(7.766) 
   
(2.994) 
   
(1.365) 
   
(1.170) 
 
CAP_Exped_PPE –0.125 –0.015 –0.197 –0.012 –0.099 –0.012 –0.605 –0.040 –0.515 –0.057 –0.956 –0.061 –3.177a –0.371a –3.693a –0.255a –0.203 –0.026 –1.101 –0.071 
 
(0.164) 
 
(0.211) 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.965) 
 
(0.375) 
 
(0.879) 
 
(0.994) 
 
(1.123) 
 
(0.502) 
 
(1.18) 
 
High_Q 
  
1.590 0.100 
  
2.220 0.148 
  
5.471 0.347c 
  
3.480b 0.241b 
  
5.196a 0.334a 
   
(1.361) 
   
(8.425) 
   
(3.409) 
   
(1.387) 
   
(1.299) 
 
Growth and investment opportunities 
                  
R&D_Total Assets –0.668 –0.081 –0.397 –0.025 –0.878c –0.109c –0.518 –0.035 –1.408a –0.156a –1.434b –0.091b –0.779 –0.091 –0.703 –0.049 –0.648 –0.084 –1.946a –0.125a 
 
(0.471) 
 
(0.666) 
 
(0.507) 
 
(0.566) 
 
(0.461) 
 
(0.638) 
 
(0.587) 
 
(0.557) 
 
(0.486) 
 
(0.598) 
 
Q –0.095 –0.012 –0.108 –0.007 –0.176b –0.022b –0.140c –0.009c –0.251b –0.028b –0.258b –0.016a –0.072 –0.008 –0.068 –0.005 –0.127c –0.016c 0.057 0.004 
 
(0.068) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.080) 
 
(0.107) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.077) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.073) 
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Table 4 (Continued)  
  
 
 LnCG_IndexP LnBoard_SizeP NEDP Stock_CompMVP Executive_CompMVP  
 Model 6A Model 6B  Model 7A Model 7B Model 8A Model 8B Model 9A Model 9B Model 10A Model 10B  
Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME Coeff. ME 
Hedging substitutes  
                    
Current Ratio 0.271c 0.033c 0.123 0.008 0.194 0.024 0.060 0.004 0.442a 0.049a –0.114 –0.007 –0.093 –0.011 –0.416b –0.029b –0.122 –0.016 –0.083 –0.005 
 
(0.148) 
 
(0.196) 
 
(0.135) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.301) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.187) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.211) 
 
LnPre_Tax_Income 0.220 0.027 0.996c 0.063b 0.442 0.055 1.031b 0.069b 0.562 0.062 1.291b 0.082b –0.146 –0.017 0.459 0.032 0.008 0.001 0.574 0.037 
 
(0.405) 
 
(0.520) 
 
(0.382) 
 
(0.482) 
 
(0.370) 
 
(0.562) 
 
(0.317) 
 
(0.455) 
 
(0.341) 
 
(0.445) 
 
ROA 1.083a 1.313a 6.472 0.409 1.080a 1.340a 3.707 0.248 13.074a 1.448a 1.011 0.641 1.175a 1.372a 9.846b 0.681b 8.742b 1.131b 1.246b 0.801b 
 
(0.385) 
 
(5.242) 
 
(0.386) 
 
(4.548) 
 
(4.509) 
 
(0.717) 
 
(0.411) 
 
(4.920) 
 
(3.831) 
 
(0.571) 
 
Size 
                    
LnMarket Value 0.911c 0.110c –1.435b –0.091b 1.253a 0.156a –0.501 –0.033 2.023a 0.224a –0.267 –0.017 2.269a 0.265a –0.193 –0.013 1.293a 0.167a –0.222 –0.014 
 
(0.475) 
 
(0.732) 
 
(0.392) 
 
(0.656) 
 
(0.489) 
 
(0.779) 
 
(0.506) 
 
(0.747) 
 
(0.384) 
 
(0.757) 
 
LnTotal Assets 0.116 0.014 2.560b 0.162b –0.364 –0.045 0.036 0.002 –1.489b –0.165b 0.504 0.032 –0.277 –0.032 1.130 0.078 –0.089 –0.012 0.993 0.064 
 
(0.597) 
 
(1.110) 
 
(0.429) 
 
(0.923) 
 
(0.594) 
 
(1.104) 
 
(0.458) 
 
(0.942) 
 
(0.463) 
 
(1.027) 
 
LnSales –0.921b –0.112b –2.149a –0.136a –0.302 –0.038 –0.002 0.001 0.215 0.024 –0.753 –0.048 –1.249a –0.146a –1.272b –0.088b –0.378 –0.049 –0.646 –0.041 
 
(0.426) 
 
(0.706) 
 
(0.319) 
 
(0.626) 
 
(0.339) 
 
(0.697) 
 
(0.433) 
 
(0.570) 
 
(0.338) 
 
(0.517) 
 
TXR –0.408 –0.049 0.286 0.018 –0.140 –0.017 0.125 0.008 0.090 0.010 0.227 0.014 –0.497 –0.058 0.337 0.023 –0.547 –0.071 –0.504 –0.032 
 
(0.772) 
 
(1.189) 
 
(0.753) 
 
(0.965) 
 
(0.784) 
 
(1.182) 
 
(0.777) 
 
(1.056) 
 
(0.757) 
 
(0.959) 
 
Constant –0.247 
 
9.261a 
 
5.866 
 
2.942 
 
2.934 
 
0.985 
 
–5.262a 
 
4.121 
 
–3.415b 
 
2.390 
 
 
(2.051) 
 
(2.891) 
 
(4.500) 
 
(8.592) 
 
(2.115) 
 
(3.812) 
 
(1.705) 
 
(2.538) 
 
(1.739) 
 
(3.378) 
 
Industry effect YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Year effect YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Diagnostic tests 
                    
Number of observations 370 
 
370 
 
370 
 
370 
 
370 
 
370 
 
370 
 
370 
 
370 
 
370 
 
Wald χ2 121.91a 
 
120.21a 
 
106.95a 
 
121.20a 
 
123.40a 
 
88.85a 
 
85.02a 
 
112.65a 
 
95.56a 
 
108.59a 
 
Log pseudolikelihood –139.88 
 
–74.93 
 
–142.45 
 
–79.28 
 
–127.91 
 
–75.05 
 
–133.87 
 
–82.41 
 
–147.15 
 
–76.01 
 
Pseudo R2 0.404 
 
0.681 
 
0.393 
 
0.662 
 
0.455 
 
0.680 
 
0.429 
 
0.649 
 
0.373 
 
0.676 
 
Pearson χ2 (goodness-of-fit) 331.75 
 
223.42 
 
364.60 
 
226.02 
 
312.94 
 
275.16 
 
332.32 
 
227.58 
 
328.75 
 
235.10 
 
Akakie information criteria 349.76 
 
217.87 
 
342.89 
 
224.57 
 
325.82 
 
216.10 
 
294.77 
 
232.81 
 
342.29 
 
220.03 
 
Correctly classified (%) 83.51 
 
91.08 
 
81.62 
 
90.27 
 
84.05 
 
91.62 
 
84.59 
 
90.27 
 
79.73 
 
90.54 
 
Variable definitions are in Appendices I and III. The superscript P indicates that the coefficient is based on the predicted values of the two-stage IV–GMM (see Eq. (2)). Models 6A, 
7A, 8A, etc. are the baseline models. Models 6B, 7B, 8B, etc. are the corresponding models with interaction terms. ME denotes the marginal effect. It represents the derivative of the 
approximate change in y for one unit change in x. Theoretically, ME should be between zero and one. ME may be outside the range of zero and one if the slope of the curve changes 
quickly. In this case, we retain the ME values that are outside the range of zero and one. Correctly classified denotes the performance of each logistic regression relative to a naive 
proportional chance model (see Joy and Tollefson, 1975). a, b, and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. The heteroscedastic-robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. Year and industry dummies are used in all estimations. Most of the year and industry effects are insignificant. We therefore apply the general-to-specific 
methodology commonly used in full-system estimation in econometrics, by sequentially removing the year and industry coefficients with the largest p-value first, as long as this 
procedure minimises the -2 log likelihood ratio (see Pagan, 1987, for a review of the general-to-specific methodology). This procedure is only applied to the year and industry coefficients 
that are insignificant. 
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Table 5: Coefficient estimates of the IV–probit regressions for currency derivatives usage  
LnCG_Index LnBoard_Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV  
 Model 11A Model 11B  Model 12A Model 12B Model 13A Model 13B Model 14A Model 14B Model 15A Model 15B  
Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  
Monitoring mechanisms 
                    
LnCG_Index 1.071a –0.039 2.099a –0.047 
                
 
(0.247) 
 
(0.210) 
                 
LnCG_Index×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –0.567a 0.081 
                
   
(0.151) 
                 
LnCG_Index×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –0.473a 0.025 
                
   
(0.160) 
                 
LnCG_Index×High_Q 
  
–0.807a 0.016 
                
   
(0.139) 
                 
LnCG_Index×Low_Q 
  
–0.837a –0.097 
                
   
(0.165) 
                 
LnCG_Index×High_Z-score 
  
–0.581a –0.053 
                
   
(0.146) 
                 
LnCG_Index×Low_Z-score 
  
–0.905a 0.001 
                
   
(0.114) 
                 
LnBoard_Size 
    
2.005c –0.730c 7.123a –0.720 
            
     
(1.134) 
 
(2.299) 
             
LnBoard_Size×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
    
–4.184a –0.121 
            
       
(1.320) 
             
LnBoard_Size×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
    
–1.458 0.902b 
            
       
(1.517) 
             
LnBoard_Size×High_Q 
      
–4.733a –0.570 
            
       
(1.745) 
             
LnBoard_Size×Low_Q 
      
–3.188b –0.209 
            
       
(1.351) 
             
LnBoard_Size×High_Z-score 
      
–0.173 1.027a 
            
       
(1.674) 
             
LnBoard_Size×Low_Z-score 
      
–4.066c 0.301 
            
       
(2.118) 
             
NED 
        
0.084a 0.002 0.120b 0.004 
        
         
(0.009) 
 
(0.060) 
         
NED×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
         
–0.034 0.006 
        
           
(0.030) 
         
NED×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
         
–0.044 –0.020 
        
           
(0.074) 
         
NED×High_Q 
          
–0.083b –0.012 
        
           
(0.040) 
         
NED×Low_Q 
          
–0.075a –0.003 
        
           
(0.025) 
         
NED×High_Z-score 
          
–0.067 –0.014 
        
           
(0.042) 
         
NED×Low_Z-score 
          
–0.068b 0.004 
        
           
(0.028) 
         
Continued 
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Table 5 (Continued)  
LnCG_Index LnBoard_Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV  
 Model 11A Model 11B  Model 12A Model 12B Model 13A Model 13B Model 14A Model 14B Model 15A Model 15B  
Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  
Managerial incentives 
                    
Stock_CompMV 
            
2.785a 0.152 3.282a –0.140 
    
             
(0.680) 
 
(1.269) 
     
Stock_CompMV×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
           
–0.262 0.246 
    
               
(0.780) 
     
Stock_CompMV×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
           
0.094 0.026 
    
               
(0.734) 
     
Stock_CompMV×High_Q 
              
0.310 0.399 
    
               
(1.127) 
     
Stock_CompMV×Low_Q 
              
–0.857 0.010 
    
               
(0.824) 
     
Stock_CompMV×High_Z-score 
             
–3.934a –0.280 
    
               
(1.279) 
     
Stock_CompMV×Low_Z-score 
             
–3.339a 0.343 
    
               
(1.152) 
     
Executive_CompMV 
                
1.794 –0.101 7.871a –0.524 
                 
(6.553) 
 
(1.058) 
 
Executive_CompMV×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
               
–2.117a 0.332 
                   
(0.459) 
 
Executive_CompMV×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
               
–2.291c 0.345 
                   
(1.373) 
 
Executive_CompMV×High_Q 
                  
–1.801b 0.487 
                   
(0.859) 
 
Executive_CompMV×Low_Q 
                  
–2.727a 0.105 
                   
(0.534) 
 
Executive_CompMV×High_Z-score 
                 
–3.565a –0.470 
                   
(0.888) 
 
Executive_CompMV×Low_Z-score 
                 
–5.190a 0.053 
                   
(0.920) 
 
Stock Price_Volatility 0.777 –0.486 0.690 –0.548 –1.633 –1.951a –3.913 –2.509a –8.212a –2.592a –6.303c –2.438a –1.060a –1.700 4.035 –1.691 –7.723 –1.868 –2.906 –2.445 
 
(1.075) 
 
(1.190) 
 
(2.866) 
 
(2.949) 
 
(2.595) 
 
(3.233) 
 
(0.242) 
 
(3.140) 
 
(6.289) 
 
(2.983) 
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Table 5 (Continued)  
LnCG_Index LnBoard_Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV  
 Model 11A Model 11B  Model 12A Model 12B Model 13A Model 13B Model 14A Model 14B Model 15A Model 15B  
Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  
Underinvestment and financial distress 
                  
IND_Avg_LEV  –6.332b –0.118 –3.649c –0.049 –6.547c 0.158 –4.649c 0.151 0.956 0.172 7.770 –0.313 5.998 0.102 –1.363a –0.063 0.956 –0.084 3.880 –0.271 
 
(3.027) 
 
(2.170) 
 
(3.364) 
 
(2.653) 
 
(4.305) 
 
(6.426) 
 
(4.035) 
 
(0.130) 
 
(1.435) 
 
(4.010) 
 
Interest_Cover –0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 –0.002 0.001 –0.002c 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002c 0.001 –0.004a 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
Z-score –0.045c 0.004 –0.026 0.001 –0.021 0.009 0.018 0.015 0.056 0.011 0.031 0.003 0.053c 0.008 –0.029 0.003 0.071 –0.005 0.024 0.005 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.038) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.032) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.038) 
 
Debt_Maturity 0.153a 0.015 0.093b 0.026 0.022 –0.030 0.013 –0.032 –0.116 –0.043 –0.149 0.002 –0.175c –0.022 0.110b 0.004 –0.188 –0.007 –0.099 0.003 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.091) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.098) 
 
(0.132) 
 
(0.092) 
 
(0.054) 
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.076) 
 
Low_Q 
  
0.861b 0.254 
  
7.153b 0.483 
  
2.458a 0.160 
  
0.523 0.062 
  
1.736a –0.031 
   
(0.349) 
   
(2.867) 
   
(0.721) 
   
(0.419) 
   
(0.308) 
 
EBIT_Market Value 0.150 –1.276a –0.077 –0.635c –3.000 –0.284 1.527 0.502 3.801b 0.782 1.443 0.851 6.392a 0.652 –6.337a 0.432 4.813 0.452 0.739 0.356 
 
(0.955) 
 
(0.973) 
 
(1.922) 
 
(2.311) 
 
(1.889) 
 
(2.621) 
 
(1.861) 
 
(2.349) 
 
(3.015) 
 
(2.000) 
 
CAP_Exped_Total Sales –0.437 –1.537c –1.777 –1.900b 1.978 –0.512 –4.174 –1.437 –6.726b –0.613 –3.872 –0.371 –6.209b –1.558b –9.269c –2.831 –2.992 –1.066 –1.499 0.025 
 
(1.357) 
 
(2.100) 
 
(3.833) 
 
(3.927) 
 
(3.316) 
 
(3.102) 
 
(2.538) 
 
(4.794) 
 
(1.602) 
 
(2.507) 
 
Dividend per Share –0.664 –0.675b –0.787 –0.465b –1.383 –0.740a –1.900c –0.787a –2.552a –0.998a –1.243 –0.772b –2.225c –0.789a –2.759 –0.984 –0.474 –0.637 –0.043 –0.451 
 
(0.647) 
 
(0.628) 
 
(0.962) 
 
(0.988) 
 
(0.991) 
 
(1.724) 
 
(1.198) 
 
(1.726) 
 
(1.088) 
 
(0.622) 
 
Low_Z-score 
  
0.698a 0.089 
  
8.711b –0.623 
  
2.192b –0.171 
  
1.720a –0.238 
  
1.973a 0.018 
   
(0.214) 
   
(4.434) 
   
(1.025) 
   
(0.592) 
   
(0.493) 
 
Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
 
1.283b 0.598a 
  
5.035c –1.447 
  
2.633 1.424 
  
0.094 0.684 
  
1.017 0.417 
   
(0.587) 
   
(3.041) 
   
(3.737) 
   
(1.052) 
   
(0.650) 
 
Overinvestment 
                    
Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –0.469 –0.916c 1.466 1.362b –1.831 –1.338a 0.186 –0.369 –4.602a –1.005c 0.362 0.642 –2.238 –1.007 –2.806 0.018 1.648 –0.599 –3.894 0.393 
 
(1.075) 
 
(1.683) 
 
(1.677) 
 
(2.309) 
 
(1.639) 
 
(2.855) 
 
(2.585) 
 
(2.713) 
 
(6.735) 
 
(3.238) 
 
High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
 
0.389 –0.318b 
  
8.662a 0.111 
  
0.766 –0.302 
  
0.171 –0.218 
  
1.084a –0.227 
   
(0.397) 
   
(2.792) 
   
(0.904) 
   
(0.454) 
   
(0.312) 
 
CAP_Exped_PPE –0.098 0.002 –0.095 –0.021 0.493c 0.078 0.343 0.130 0.385 0.079 0.262 –0.031 –0.329 –0.030 0.671b –0.026 –0.415 0.119 0.768b 0.072 
 
(0.076) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.275) 
 
(0.326) 
 
(0.284) 
 
(0.328) 
 
(0.270) 
 
(0.284) 
 
(0.900) 
 
(0.313) 
 
High_Q 
  
1.143a –0.097 
  
9.987a 1.129 
  
2.501b 0.297 
  
0.077 –0.111 
  
0.440 –0.214 
   
(0.250) 
   
(3.792) 
   
(1.220) 
   
(0.410) 
   
(0.366) 
 
High_Z-score 
  
0.570b 0.123 
  
0.706 –2.128a 
  
2.126 0.466 
  
0.491 0.141 
  
1.021a 0.247 
   
(0.262) 
   
(3.539) 
   
(1.556) 
   
(0.419) 
   
(0.359) 
 
Growth and investment opportunities 
                  
R&D_Total Assets –0.547a –0.232a –0.577a –0.217a –0.567b –0.146c –0.456c –0.100 –0.464 –0.079 –0.169 –0.046 –0.084 –0.247 –0.571c –0.125 –0.335 –0.165 –0.421 –0.130 
 
(0.152) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.233) 
 
(0.257) 
 
(0.359) 
 
(0.403) 
 
(0.777) 
 
(0.326) 
 
(0.620) 
 
(0.410) 
 
Q 0.037 –0.010 0.010 –0.007 –0.030 –0.019c –0.043 –0.019c –0.021 –0.020c –0.048c –0.011 –0.039 –0.025c 0.072b –0.016 –0.005 –0.123 –0.019 –0.013 
 
(0.035) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.036) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.031) 
 
(0.029) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.034) 
 
(0.225) 
 
(0.026) 
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Table 5 (Continued)  
LnCG_Index LnBoard_Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV  
 Model 11A Model 11B  Model 12A Model 12B Model 13A Model 13B Model 14A Model 14B Model 15A Model 15B  
Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  
Hedging substitutes  
                    
Current Ratio –0.111c –0.029 –0.001 0.001 –0.047 –0.068c –0.158 –0.061c –0.167 –0.054 –0.145 –0.101c 0.058 –0.043 –0.003 –0.091 0.094 –0.041 –0.076 –0.037 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.133) 
 
(0.112) 
 
(0.228) 
 
(0.206) 
 
(0.196) 
 
(0.185) 
 
(0.093) 
 
LnPre_Tax_Income –0.132 0.090 –0.039 0.124b 0.222 0.096 0.447 0.156b –0.165 0.033 0.269 0.136 0.089 0.153 0.313 0.190 0.144 0.066 –0.242 0.139 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.281) 
 
(0.322) 
 
(0.241) 
 
(0.502) 
 
(0.436) 
 
(0.424) 
 
(1.177) 
 
(0.289) 
 
ROA 0.898 –0.154 0.488 –0.981 1.227 –0.419 –0.510 –0.632 –2.448 –0.271 –0.169 –0.386 –3.581 –0.679 1.482 –0.480 –3.523 –0.788 0.595 –0.879 
 
(1.270) 
 
(1.562) 
 
(1.802) 
 
(2.200) 
 
(3.056) 
 
(2.953) 
 
(3.232) 
 
(2.747) 
 
(4.571) 
 
(2.740) 
 
Size 
                    
LnMarket Value –0.135 0.119c –0.234 0.203b 0.414 0.172c 0.398 0.139 0.637b 0.153c –0.085 0.048 0.226 0.090 0.463 –0.001 –1.058 0.153 0.990b 0.028 
 
(0.131) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(0.288) 
 
(0.328) 
 
(0.323) 
 
(0.398) 
 
(0.372) 
 
(0.316) 
 
(3.274) 
 
(0.502) 
 
LnTotal Assets –0.226 –0.114 –0.030 –0.310b –0.214 –0.057 –0.083 –0.077 –0.262 –0.113 0.063 –0.065 –0.521 –0.171 –0.327 0.007 –0.308 –0.160 –0.532 –0.150 
 
(0.219) 
 
(0.366) 
 
(0.318) 
 
(0.461) 
 
(0.421) 
 
(0.558) 
 
(0.484) 
 
(0.418) 
 
(0.904) 
 
(0.465) 
 
LnSales –0.156 0.017 –0.172 0.069 –0.310 –0.059 –0.448c –0.078 –0.259 –0.004 –0.211 –0.091 0.200 –0.031 –0.387 –0.163 0.090 –0.014 0.088 –0.024 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.218) 
 
(0.264) 
 
(0.183) 
 
(0.369) 
 
(0.257) 
 
(0.288) 
 
(0.236) 
 
(0.211) 
 
TXR 0.688a –0.016 0.266 –0.137 –0.972 –0.056 –0.831 –0.012 –0.713 –0.170 0.585 0.056 –0.191 –0.093 –0.456 0.028 0.290 –0.238 0.246 –0.192 
 
(0.220) 
 
(0.294) 
 
(0.713) 
 
(0.660) 
 
(0.894) 
 
(1.316) 
 
(1.070) 
 
(0.781) 
 
(3.137) 
 
(0.921) 
 
Constant 2.690a 
 
0.681 
 
–1.849 
 
–1.330b 
 
0.879 
 
–1.754 
 
2.679 
 
0.050 
 
0.658 
 
–5.269b 
 
 
(0.697) 
 
(0.702) 
 
(2.702) 
 
(0.569) 
 
(1.227) 
 
(2.452) 
 
(1.976) 
 
(2.700) 
 
(1.405) 
 
(2.151) 
 
Infudtry effect YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Year effect YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Diagnostic tests 
                    
Number of observations 498 
 
507 
 
223 
 
223 
 
216 
 
216 
 
206 
 
206 
 
212 
 
212 
 
Wald χ2 751.35a 
 
935.09a 
 
140.10a 
 
245.13a 
 
249.08a 
 
334.42a 
 
226.88a 
 
478.05a 
 
256.13a 
 
398.02a 
 
Log pseudolikelihood –239.77 
 
64.79 
 
252.9 
 
407.7 
 
–683.47 
 
–536.80 
 
96.17 
 
347.1 
 
66.7 
 
320.6 
 
Wald χ2 of exogeneity 145.71a 
 
33.95a 
 
23.86a 
 
23.18a 
 
13.77a 
 
24.19a 
 
4.56c 
 
44.65a 
 
15.04a 
 
93.43a 
 
Akakie information criteria 675.53 
 
118.42 
 
–331.75 
 
–575.29 
 
1,548.94 
 
1,301.60 
 
–16.33 
 
–436.22 
 
54.59 
 
–377.09 
 
Correctly classified (%) 73.29 
 
83.43 
 
80.27 
 
84.75 
 
82.41 
 
82.41 
 
83.50 
 
84.95 
 
80.6 
 
84.43 
 
Variable definitions are in Appendices I and III. The instrumental variables (IVs) are chosen from the list of the industry average measures shown in Panel B of Appendix I. Not all 
the IVs in the list are used. The chosen IVs are those that satisfy the exogeneity condition. ME denotes marginal effects. It represents the derivative of the approximate change in y 
for one unit change in x. Theoretically, ME should be between zero and one. ME may be outside the range of zero and one if the slope of the curve changes quickly. In this case, we 
retain the ME values that are outside the range of zero and one. Models 11A, 12A, 13A, etc. are the baseline models. Models 11B, 12B, 13B, etc. are the corresponding models with 
interaction terms. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. The heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Year and 
industry dummies are used in all estimations. Most of the year and industry effects are insignificant. We therefore apply the general-to-specific methodology commonly used in full-
system estimation in econometrics, by sequentially removing the year and industry coefficients with the largest p-value first, as long as this procedure minimises the -2 log likelihood 
ratio (see Pagan, 1987, for a review of the general-to-specific methodology). This procedure only applies to the year and industry coefficients that are insignificant. The final model 
contains one or two year and industry dummy variables. The percentage correctly classified is the percentage of firm-year observations that is correctly classified. The statistical 
significance of the percentage correctly classified is determined using the Joy and Tollefson (1975) approach where the percentage correctly classified is tested against a naive 
proportional chance model. 
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Table 6: Coefficient estimates of the IV–probit regressions for IR derivatives usage  
LnCG_Index LnBoard_Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV  
 Model 16A Model 16B  Model 17A Model 17B Model 18A Model 18B Model 19A Model 19B Model 20A Model 20B  
Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  
Monitoring mechanisms 
                    
LnCG_Index 1.034c –0.021 2.494a –0.044 
                
 
(0.573) 
 
(0.234) 
                 
LnCG_Index×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –0.937a –0.024 
                
   
(0.126) 
                 
LnCG_Index×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –0.306 –0.002 
                
   
(0.221) 
                 
LnCG_Index×High_Q 
  
–1.042a –0.025 
                
   
(0.164) 
                 
LnCG_Index×Low_Q 
  
–0.880a 0.026 
                
   
(0.144) 
                 
LnCG_Index×High_Z-score 
  
–0.083 0.220a 
                
   
(0.248) 
                 
LnCG_Index×Low_Z-score 
  
–0.872a 0.110a 
                
   
(0.171) 
                 
LnBoard_Size 
    
2.571a –0.886a 1.225a –1.208 
            
     
(0.986) 
 
(0.194) 
             
LnBoard_Size×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
    
–6.024a 0.075 
            
       
(1.552) 
             
LnBoard_Size×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
    
0.997 4.014 
            
       
(3.638) 
             
LnBoard_Size×High_Q 
      
–9.478a 1.106 
            
       
(1.699) 
             
LnBoard_Size×Low_Q 
      
–6.239a –1.062 
            
       
(1.871) 
             
LnBoard_Size×Low_Z-score 
      
–6.554a 0.193 
            
       
(2.052) 
             
NED 
        
0.037b –0.006 0.234a 0.022 
        
         
(0.019) 
 
(0.031) 
         
NED×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
         
–0.131a –0.018 
        
           
(0.026) 
         
NED×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
         
–0.106 –0.049b 
        
           
(0.069) 
         
NED×High_Q 
          
–0.168a –0.025c 
        
           
(0.033) 
         
NED×Low_Q 
          
–0.093a –0.010 
        
           
(0.024) 
         
NED×Low_Z-score 
          
–0.154a –0.021 
        
           
(0.030) 
         
Continued 
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Table 6 (Continued)  
LnCG_Index LnBoard_Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV  
 Model 16A Model 16B  Model 17A Model 17B Model 18A Model 18B Model 19A Model 19B Model 20A Model 20B  
Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  
Managerial incentives 
                    
Stock_CompMV 
            
3.139a –0.312 1.394a –0.007 
    
             
(1.029) 
 
(0.420) 
     
Stock_CompMV×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
           
–1.387a –0.840 
    
               
(0.332) 
     
Stock_CompMV×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
           
8.425 1.988 
    
               
(5.617) 
     
Stock_CompMV×High_Q 
              
–9.623b –1.500b 
    
               
(4.012) 
     
Stock_CompMV×Low_Q 
              
–1.641c –3.165c 
    
               
(0.863) 
     
Stock_CompMV×Low_Z-score 
              
–8.372 0.856 
    
               
(6.573) 
     
Executive_CompMV 
                
2.379a –0.155 6.033a –0.776 
                 
(0.635) 
 
(1.454) 
 
Executive_CompMV×High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
               
–1.956b 0.569 
                   
(0.961) 
 
Executive_CompMV×Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
               
0.312 0.801b 
                   
(0.712) 
 
Executive_CompMV×High_Q 
                  
–3.989a –0.160 
                   
(1.136) 
 
Executive_CompMV×Low_Q 
                  
–2.177a 0.566c 
                   
(0.743) 
 
Executive_CompMV×Low_Z-score 
                 
–4.424a 0.197 
                   
(1.346) 
 
Stock Price_Volatility –4.557a –1.292a –3.761a –0.974a –5.992a –2.365a –3.850 –3.612 –1.604 –2.623a 0.096 –2.800a –7.916a –2.649a –1.463 –4.035a –4.521 –2.469a –1.176 –2.045a 
 
(1.532) 
 
(1.399) 
 
(2.111) 
 
(2.642) 
 
(2.416) 
 
(3.927) 
 
(3.027) 
 
(1.1.54) 
 
(3.791) 
 
(2.381) 
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Table 6 (Continued)  
LnCG_Index LnBoard_Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV  
 Model 16A Model 16B  Model 17A Model 17B Model 18A Model 18B Model 19A Model 19B Model 20A Model 20B  
Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  
Underinvestment and financial distress 
                  
IND_Avg_LEV  5.200b 0.265 2.451 0.195 5.578a –0.191 2.557 –0.124 9.356a –0.229 –0.943 1.134 5.890a 0.384 7.313 0.997 5.196b 0.510 6.219a 0.579 
 
(2.441) 
 
(2.209) 
 
(1.458) 
 
(1.637) 
 
(1.630) 
 
(2.299) 
 
(1.727) 
 
(6.048) 
 
(2.214) 
 
(2.274) 
 
Interest_Cover 0.001 –0.001 0.001 0.001 –0.006 –0.003b –0.010 –0.007c –0.007 –0.005b 
          
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.005) 
           
Z-score –0.055 –0.060b –0.144 –0.103a 0.165b –0.005 0.089 0.026 0.264b 0.013 –0.315a –0.049 0.038 –0.022 –0.627 –0.147a 0.208a –0.017 0.012 –0.061 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.101) 
 
(0.080) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.465) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.118) 
 
Debt_Maturity –0.098 0.031 –0.132a 0.014 0.068 0.031 0.085 –0.013 0.071 0.040c –0.050 0.040 
    
–0.097 0.047c –0.102 0.040c 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.079) 
     
(0.074) 
 
(0.077) 
 
Low_Q 
  
0.500a –0.029 
  
12.318a 1.579 
  
2.992a 0.270 
  
–1.483 –0.617c 
  
1.063b –0.469c 
   
(0.191) 
   
(3.636) 
   
(0.755) 
   
(2.617) 
   
(0.530) 
 
EBIT_Market Value –0.460 –0.587 –0.261 –0.404 –0.423 –1.328a 0.487 0.042 1.251 –0.111 2.390 1.586a 3.692b –0.300 1.059 0.399 3.457c –0.164 –0.480 0.775 
 
(1.633) 
 
(1.138) 
 
(2.093) 
 
(2.115) 
 
(1.908) 
 
(2.528) 
 
(1.532) 
 
(3.085) 
 
(1.937) 
 
(1.879) 
 
CAP_Exped_Total Sales –1.067 –0.305 –0.890 –0.359c –2.875 1.397 –0.093 3.081 –6.979a 0.655 1.982 0.970 –6.212b –0.484 1.094 1.718b –9.561a –1.422 –4.682b 2.370b 
 
(0.708) 
 
(0.629) 
 
(3.265) 
 
(3.753) 
 
(2.650) 
 
(2.391) 
 
(2.704) 
 
(7.406) 
 
(1.949) 
 
(2.216) 
 
Dividend per Share –0.402 –0.517a –1.064 –0.591a –0.540 –0.894a –0.583 –1.326 –1.131 –0.821a –2.025 –1.198a –1.326 –0.498b –6.865 –1.699a –0.246 –0.469c –0.385 –0.666a 
 
(0.721) 
 
(0.730) 
 
(0.901) 
 
(1.122) 
 
(0.915) 
 
(1.770) 
 
(0.989) 
 
(4.735) 
 
(0.674) 
 
(0.833) 
 
Low_Z-score 
  
–0.751c –0.462a 
  
12.055a –1.275 
  
3.546a –0.142 
  
–4.422 –1.624c 
  
0.870 –0.433 
   
(0.448) 
   
(4.605) 
   
(0.806) 
   
(6.174) 
   
(0.833) 
 
Low_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
 
1.089b 0.449a 
  
–0.025 –7.258 
  
4.767 2.715b 
  
2.586 0.445 
  
0.151 –0.105 
   
(0.499) 
   
(6.812) 
   
(3.761) 
   
(2.702) 
   
(0.550) 
 
Overinvestment 
                    
Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets –0.070 –0.284 1.954 1.105a 2.697 0.176 0.260 2.521 –6.094b 0.952 –5.436 –2.217c –3.692 –0.415 2.085 1.803 –4.409c –0.788 –3.727 –0.920 
 
(1.617) 
 
(2.022) 
 
(3.059) 
 
(2.719) 
 
(2.940) 
 
(3.350) 
 
(2.908) 
 
(5.586) 
 
(2.325) 
 
(2.984) 
 
High_Free-Cash-Flow_Total Assets 
 
0.604b –0.042 
  
1.254a –0.368 
  
3.947a 0.479 
  
1.962c –0.096 
  
0.893c –0.182 
   
(0.260) 
   
(0.329) 
   
(0.722) 
   
(1.090) 
   
(0.485) 
 
CAP_Exped_PPE –0.006 –0.047 0.007 –0.003 –0.940 –0.289 –1.050 –0.785b –0.703 –0.243 0.834 –0.103 
    
–0.116 –0.003 –0.123 –0.096 
 
(0.110) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.643) 
 
(0.816) 
 
(0.561) 
 
(0.558) 
     
(0.420) 
 
(0.362) 
 
High_Q 
  
1.331a 0.093 
  
2.107a –2.085 
  
5.167a 0.658 
  
6.149c 1.263b 
  
2.060a 0.244 
   
(0.281) 
   
(0.357) 
   
(0.878) 
   
(3.560) 
   
(0.635) 
 
Growth and investment opportunities 
                  
R&D_Total Assets –0.109 –0.059 –0.248b –0.063c –0.616 –0.335a –0.207 –0.413 –1.512a –0.268b –0.708 –0.440b –0.354 –0.297a –1.900 –0.410a –0.121 –0.423a –1.067a –0.401a 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.117) 
 
(0.406) 
 
(0.351) 
 
(0.415) 
 
(0.580) 
 
(0.385) 
 
(1.219) 
 
(0.411) 
 
(0.371) 
 
Q –0.083 –0.021b –0.034 –0.011 –0.087c –0.035a –0.080c –0.041 –0.092b –0.042a –0.055 –0.048a –0.087 –0.055a –0.458 –0.128b –0.025 –0.065a –0.037 –0.066a 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.033) 
 
(0.045) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.062) 
 
(0.060) 
 
(0.373) 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.047) 
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Table 6 (Continued)  
LnCG_Index LnBoard_Size NED Stock_CompMV Executive_CompMV  
 Model 16A Model 16B  Model 17A Model 17B Model 18A Model 18B Model 19A Model 19B Model 20A Model 20B  
Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  Coeff. ME  
Hedging substitutes  
                    
Current Ratio 0.089 0.014 0.003 –0.015 0.051 –0.098a –0.043 –0.241c –0.244b –0.015 –0.372b –0.113b 0.196 –0.042 –0.489 –0.134a 0.070 –0.014 0.186 –0.040 
 
(0.067) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.156) 
 
(0.206) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.446) 
 
(0.084) 
 
(0.118) 
 
LnPre_Tax_Income –0.061 –0.001 –0.154 0.026 0.075 0.155a 0.111 0.142b 0.612a 0.111c 
          
 
(0.167) 
 
(0.123) 
 
(0.227) 
 
(0.282) 
 
(0.211) 
           
ROA –1.224 1.086 2.384 0.470 –2.067 0.619 1.071 0.532 –3.852 0.938c 1.012a 2.369 –2.925 1.449b 3.390 7.666a –3.161 1.394c –1.665 1.226b 
  (2.649) 
 
(1.679) 
 
(2.809) 
 
(1.939) 
 
(3.852) 
 
(0.324) 
 
(3.605) 
 
(2.641) 
 
(2.215) 
 
(2.365) 
 
Size 
                    
LnMarket Value –0.017 0.149 –0.819a –0.018 0.101 0.011 –1.295c –0.599c 0.876a –0.120 –0.320c –0.017 0.919a 0.089 –4.153 –1.029a 1.104a 0.056 0.545b –0.128 
 
(0.306) 
 
(0.206) 
 
(0.236) 
 
(0.679) 
 
(0.302) 
 
(0.181) 
 
(0.207) 
 
(3.326) 
 
(0.180) 
 
(0.221) 
 
LnTotal Assets –0.567a –0.067 0.426c 0.026 –0.310 0.030 1.160 0.673 –1.001a 0.101 
  
–0.823b 0.049 5.149 1.296a 
    
 
(0.199) 
 
(0.232) 
 
(0.372) 
 
(0.755) 
 
(0.324) 
   
(0.366) 
 
(4.090) 
     
LnSales 0.013 0.013 –0.224 –0.015 0.144 –0.175 –0.373 –0.361 0.197 –0.230c –0.119 –0.005 0.401 –0.185b –2.098 –0.621a –0.098 –0.188 0.175 –0.146 
 
(0.249) 
 
(0.146) 
 
(0.337) 
 
(0.351) 
 
(0.289) 
 
(0.251) 
 
(0.283) 
 
(1.696) 
 
(0.232) 
 
(0.355) 
 
TXR 0.207 –0.067 0.496 0.047 0.814 0.216 –1.968c –0.880 –0.982 0.673a –0.935 –0.436c –0.278 0.121 –5.750a –1.035c 0.437 0.198 0.018 0.075 
 
(0.391) 
 
(0.342) 
 
(0.828) 
 
(1.037) 
 
(0.796) 
 
(0.883) 
 
(0.576) 
 
(2.055) 
 
(0.469) 
 
(0.593) 
 
Constant 3.513c 
 
3.506a 
 
–4.853c 
 
–2.158a 
 
–5.701b 
 
–2.077 
 
–2.903 
 
1.120 
 
–8.102a 
 
–7.525a 
 
 
(2.009) 
 
(0.980) 
 
(2.907) 
 
(5.020) 
 
(2.700) 
 
(2.325) 
 
(2.342) 
 
(1.164) 
 
(2.200) 
 
(2.895) 
 
Industry effect YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Year effect YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
Diagnostic tests 
                    
Number of observations 370 
 
370 
 
153 
 
153 
 
145 
 
161 
 
152 
 
156 
 
156 
 
156 
 
Wald χ2 464.22a 
 
627.1a 
 
177.21a 
 
207.99a 
 
298.51a 
 
361.47a 
 
222.43a 
 
189.37a 
 
345.13a 
 
377.17a 
 
Log pseudolikelihood –216.45 
 
90.98 
 
178.8 
 
317 
 
–429.96 
 
–351.61 
 
124.2 
 
335.4 
 
56.41 
 
256.6 
 
Wald χ2 of exogeneity 43.32a 
 
126.46a 
 
107.42a 
 
70.38a 
 
139.52a 
 
52.66a 
 
80.10a 
 
9.21a 
 
212.76a 
 
143.46a 
 
Akakie information criteria 604.9 
 
54.05 
 
–165.69 
 
–426.02 
 
1,057.92 
 
897.2 
 
–78.31 
 
–466.71 
 
61.17 
 
–301.39 
 
Correctly classified (%) 79.19 
 
94.59 
 
88.24 
 
95.42 
 
91.72 
 
91.93 
 
90.79 
 
93.59 
 
88.46 
 
92.31 
 
Variable definitions are in Appendices I and III. The instrumental variables (IVs) are chosen from the list of the industry average measures shown in Panel B of Appendix I. Not all 
the IVs in the list are used. The chosen IVs are those that satisfy the exogeneity condition. ME denotes marginal effects. It represents the derivative of the approximate change in y 
for one unit change in x. Theoretically, ME should be between zero and one. ME may be outside the range of zero and one if the slope of the curve changes quickly. In this case, we 
retain ME values that are outside the range of zero and one. Models 16A, 17A, 18A, etc. are the baseline models. Models 16B, 17B, 18B, etc. are the corresponding models with 
interaction terms. a, b, and c denote statistical significance at a 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. The heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. Year 
and industry dummies are used in all estimations. Most of the year and industry effects are insignificant. We therefore apply the general-to-specific methodology commonly used in 
full-system estimation in econometrics, by sequentially removing the year and industry coefficients with the largest p-value first, as long as this procedure minimises the -2 log 
likelihood ratio (see Pagan, 1987, for a review of the general-to-specific methodology). This procedure only applies to the year and industry coefficients that are insignificant. The 
final model contains one or two year and industry dummies The percentage correctly classified is the percentage of firm-year observations that is correctly classified. The statistical 
significance of the percentage correctly classified is determined using the Joy and Tollefson (1975) approach where the percentage correctly classified is tested against a naive 
proportional chance model. 
 
 
 
